US sanctions and the future of Turkish-Iranian energy ties

April 17, 2019

On paper, Turkey and Iran should be natural partners when it comes to energy. On the one hand, Turkey has a growing demand for oil and gas and lacks significant domestic resources, making it highly reliant on imports. On the other hand, Iran has huge hydrocarbons reserves — the world’s fourth largest for oil and second largest for gas, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. In reality though, things are more complicated. Energy relations between the two countries are not without their challenges, foremost among which are U.S. sanctions on Iran and disputes over pricing, although there is also a strong opportunity for greater cooperation in the form of Turkey’s efforts to become a regional energy hub.

At present, Iran is one of Turkey’s leading suppliers of oil and gas. According to figures from the Turkish Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA), as of January 2019, Iran was Turkey’s third-largest source of oil imports by volume, accounting for 12.35 percent of the total, behind Iraq (23.5 percent) and Russia (15 percent). It was also Turkey’s second-largest supplier of natural gas, accounting for just over 14 percent of the total, behind Russia (31.6 percent) and narrowly ahead of Azerbaijan (13.9 percent) and Algeria (12 percent).

U.S. sanctions
The reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran in October 2018 has presented an immediate and obvious hurdle to Turkish-Iranian energy ties. In the aftermath of the U.S. move, Turkey’s purchases of Iranian crude oil reportedly fell to zero, according to news reports. Since then, however, they have picked up again. Turkey was one of eight countries that received a temporary sanctions waiver enabling it to continue buying Iranian crude for a limited period of time, on the condition that it work to reduce its imports of Iranian oil and find alternative suppliers. The waivers are currently set to expire in May, and it is unclear as yet if the Trump administration will extend them. Nevertheless, the trend when it comes to oil imports from Iran is clearly downward: According to figures from EMRA, they fell by nearly half from January 2018 to January 2019, from 22 percent of total imports to 12.35 percent.

Pricing dispute
Pricing has long been a bone of contention between Turkey and Iran when it comes to energy. Under a 25-year agreement signed in 2001, Iran exports 10 billion cubic meters of gas annually to Turkey at a price of $507 per thousand cubic meters. Turkey first objected to Iran’s prices in 2009, when it said they were too expensive and demanded a discount. Soon after, an arbitration court granted Turkey a 12.5 percent discount on the original price. In 2012 Turkey took action against Iran again, suing it for overpricing on gas sales, and in 2016 the International Court of Arbitration (ICA) ruled against Iran in its dispute with Turkey. After reviewing the case, the ICA ordered Iran to reduce its gas prices by 13.3% by the end of 2016 and pay $1.9 billion in compensation to Turkey due to overpricing.

Iran’s gas prices are indeed much higher than those of its competitors, Azerbaijan and Russia, making it unlikely that Iran will be able to maintain its share of Turkey’s energy market unless it takes action. The current natural gas contract between the two countries is set to expire in 2026, and Turkey is planning to construct infrastructure to boost imports from Azerbaijan and Russia in regions of the country that primarily consume Iranian gas at present. Considering these factors, if Iran wants to maintain its role as a key natural gas exporter to Turkey and extend the existing contract past 2026, it will need to offer additional discounts or other incentives.

Turkey’s efforts to become a regional energy hub
One major potential opportunity for closer cooperation is Turkey’s ambitions of becoming a regional energy hub, leveraging the country’s geography and pipeline network to serve as an energy corridor between the oil-and-gas-rich states of Central Asia and the Middle East and the major consumer countries in Europe. If Turkey can put in place the required infrastructure and liberalize its energy market, this goal may be achievable, and energy imports from Iran could help it to realize this objective.

In line with its broader aim of becoming a regional energy hub, Turkey is working to diversify its oil and gas supplies as a central part of its energy policy. At present, the country is planning to import more natural gas through projects such as Turk Stream, an undersea gas pipeline running from Russia to Turkey. Liquefied natural gas (LNG), primarily from Qatar and the U.S., is also playing a growing role in the Turkish energy market. Imports from the latter jumped from nothing to nearly 8 percent of the total in just one year, from January 2018 to January 2019, according to figures from EMRA.

In theory, Iran could play a greater role here as well, but boosting the volume of Iranian gas exports to sell on to other countries would not be easy. Iran needs foreign technology and financing to increase its production, but due to U.S. sanctions neither is likely to be forthcoming until Iran can solve its problems with the West over its nuclear program, missile tests, and human right issues. In addition to addressing its geopolitical problems, Iran also needs a legal framework that would help to attract foreign investment. Without foreign energy firms and foreign capital, Iran will be not be able to produce more oil and gas for export. It will also need to address the issue of reliability, which has long been a problem with Iranian gas exports. If the country is to play a greater role as a supplier, it needs to guarantee that it will not cut the flow of gas, especially in wintertime.

Despite their proximity and complementarity as producer and consumer, Iran and Turkey face considerable, if not insurmountable, hurdles to closer cooperation on energy. If they can manage to overcome the challenges associated with U.S. sanctions and pricing and leverage the opportunities presented by Turkish efforts to become a regional energy hub, the two may well be able to finally make the most of what should be a natural partnership.

Omid Shokri Kalehsar is a Washington-based senior energy security analyst, currently serving as a visiting research scholar in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. Omid is a PhD candidate in international relations at Yalova University, Turkey. The views he expresses are strictly his own.

www.mei.edu

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Strategic Port Deal with US May Affect Iran-Oman Relations


The deal will improve the United States’ ability to develop power in the Persian Gulf. 

Oman has been able to steer clear of regional disputes in recent years and play a more balanced role in the Gulf while maintaining good relationships with both Iran and the United States.

However, US sanctions against the Iranian oil sector have challenged the bulk of Iran’s energy transit and export plans, including the Iran-Oman natural gas pipeline.

The United States and Oman have signed an agreement allowing Washington to use Omani ports for commercial, military and security purposes. The agreement gives US military forces better access to the Arabian Gulf and fewer ships will need to sail through the Strait of Hormuz.

The deal will improve the United States’ ability to develop power in the Persian Gulf. The port of Duqm is strategically located outside the Strait of Hormuz and is 550km from Muscat. It’s an ideal port for the development of the sector.

Iran expressed interest in using the same ports and has many times threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz, which is a strategic oil shipment route, in response to hostile US actions.

The strait, a sensitive position in pipeline projects, has always been a source of conflict between Iran and the United States. In August 2018, the United States claimed full control over the oil and gas pipelines in the area and threatened to resort to force if Iran disrupted passage of ships from the area.

Regardless of the US presence in the region and the various deals signed with Arab countries, Iran’s ties with countries such as Oman remain strong and significant.

By the end of 2018, Iran-Oman trade volume totalled approximately $1 billion. The development of a maritime transport fleet between the two countries, the facilitation of visa issuance for Iranian and Omani nationals, the increase in Iranian companies in Oman and the more competitive prices of Iranian exports in Oman have improved relations between the parties.

In 2013, Iran and Oman signed a memorandum of understanding on natural gas exports. With Iran’s implementation, the gas pipeline ran directly from the Gulf to Oman.

The 25-year contract for the transfer of Iranian gas to Oman through the pipeline was worth $6 billion. Tehran and Muscat agreed to issue 1 billion cubic feet of gas per day from Iran to Oman. Part of the gas would be converted to liquid natural gas (LNG) in target markets. The remaining capacity of the pipeline would involve future markets in the southern Persian Gulf.

Iran and Oman have agreed to change the route and design of the Iran-Oman submarine pipeline to avoid crossing UAE territorial waters. Iran’s gas pipelines to Oman would pass through a depth of about 1,000 metres, instead of 300 metres, so its distance would be slightly shorter and doesn’t cross UAE territory.

Iran has five LNG projects but, because of sanctions, these projects are incomplete. Iran planned to use natural gas to export to Oman and use some of this natural gas to produce LNG in Omani facilities.

Even if the strategic agreement between the United States and Oman does not affect the Iran-Oman natural gas project, Iran will have a hard time completing its natural gas projects and oil production capacity recovery projects without solving its problems with the West over human rights abuses and missile programme development.
https://thearabweekly.com

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Sanctions Against Iran and Venezuela Made US Leader in Oil Production – Expert

According to JODI [Joint Organisations Data Initiative], for eleven months now the United States has been the world leader in terms of monthly oil production. According to the organisation, in January 2019, Saudi Arabia’s production amounted to 10.243 million barrels per day.

At the same time, US oil production in January was 11.881 million barrels a day compared to 11.849 million barrels per day in December 2018.

Speaking to Sputnik, Omid Shokri Kalehsar, a Washington-based Iranian independent energy security expert, noted that oil sanctions against Iran and Venezuela will allow the US to appropriate these countries’ share of the world market:

“As a result of the shale revolution, the United States, who had previously imported oil, was able to become self-sustaining in the field of energy, as well as to become one of the largest gas and LNG [liquefied natural gas] suppliers both to neighbouring countries and to its allies, primarily in Europe. The US uses energy exports as a driver in their relations with other countries, and together with the use of such a tool as sanctions, this factor has become decisive in shaping US foreign policy”, the expert said.

Mr Kalehsar also noted that the US has repeatedly imposed sanctions against Iran with the most recent ones being imposed on 4 November 2018 and leading to a significant reduction in Iranian exports.

“If the US continues their sanctions policy and if the exemption from sanctions granted to eight countries that import Iranian oil is not extended in May, Iran’s oil exports are likely to decline even more”, the energy security expert told Sputnik.

Speaking about the policy’s objectives, Omid Shukri Kalehsar said that the United States has become one of the largest oil producers, and oil sanctions against Iran and Venezuela will allow them to appropriate these countries’ share of the world market.

According to the expert, this applies not only to the United States, but also to other oil-producing countries, including members and non-members of OPEC.

“If Iran and Venezuela keep oil production and exports at the same level, no one can take their place; therefore, sanctions against Iran and Venezuela benefit not only the United States, but also OPEC”, Kalehsar concluded.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of Omid Shokri Kalehsar and do not necessarily reflect the official position of Sputnik.
https://sputniknews.com

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US, Russia Compete for EU Natural Gas Market

The global markets for natural gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) are currently seeing an increase in the number of new producers. Natural gas’ geopolitical importance is also on the rise and it will increase its share of the energy basket of countries by 2040 as countries with natural gas resources seek to increase their share of the LNG market. The share of natural gas and volatile energy in the global energy market rises every day. In 2016, LNG’s contribution to the global gas market was 42 percent, and according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), will reach 53 percent in 2040.

Of countries that export LNG, Qatar has the largest export share. In 2017, of 264 million tons produced in the world, 77 million tons came from Qatar. Currently, countries such as Australia, Russia, the U.S. and Mozambique have made huge investments in to increase their market share. In the shadow of the shale gas revolution and technology and innovation, the U.S. has quickly become one of the largest manufacturers of LNG, which will soon play an important role in the security of energy in the European Union and East Asian countries.

Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has not taken place without considering the opportunity to export more energy resources. The United States uses energy exports, especially LNG, to expand its relations with its neighbors and allies everywhere. The energy security of the European Union and its strong dependence on Russian gas have led the United States to take a special look at the European Union energy market, and with the increase in LNG exports and the accelerated construction of the Southern Corridor, gas will require the EU to depend on Russia. Looking at the state of import of Iranian oil and gas condensate from Iran, the U.S. LNG role could be furthered in a boycott of Iran.

The geopolitical dimensions

Energy geopolitics is changing. The shale gas revolution and innovative high technology has enabled the U.S. to become a giant energy exporter. Energy exports play an import role in U.S. foreign policy, and the U.S. is using energy exports to expand relationships with allies. This important step was due to improving its infrastructure, including the development of gas pipelines and LNG facilities for export.

Russia is not interested in losing the EU market and is trying to keep its share in the EU market by diversifying transit pipelines and LNG projects such as Turk Stream and North Stream II. Gazprom also has several pipelines currently in operation or under construction with European energy companies. Gazprom is also preparing a Turk Stream pipeline to transfer Russian gas through the Black Sea to Turkey and southeastern Europe. The U.S. has many times officially declared that it is against North Stream II; this project has been heavily criticized in Europe and the United States, and the German “Trump,” Russia’s largest captive foreign gas buyer, has been “captured” by Russia.

According to Dan Brouillette, the deputy secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy, North Stream II will increase the dependence of Germany and Europe on Russian gas, but recently Germany has decided to help finance the final installations for importing liquefied natural gas that will reduce this dependence.

In October 2018, the largest volume of gas went to Europe, about 24 percent of total [U.S.] LNG: 0.6 billion cubic meters. By 2017, only 10 percent of LNG gas was exported to the European Union. The European Union Energy Commission expects U.S. exports and facilities for LNG terminals to double throughout Europe by 2022. “The fact is that American LNGs can play a more competitive role in supplying gas, increasing the diversity and security of energy in the future,” said the European Union on LNG trade between the United States and Europe in late November.

 

Qatar’s Plan

Early in January, Qatar’s energy minister told Reuters last year, Qatar’s petroleum company plans to invest at least $20 billion in the United States over the next few years and is expected to make its final decision on the LNG terminal concerning the Golden Pass of Texas soon. Qatar is also planning to invest in Germany and export LNG to Germany. According to Qatari officials, it will invest €10 billion in the German economy, which could be the continuation of successful Qatari investments in Germany.

Washington has been encouraging European countries to diversify Russian-dominated energy supplies, with Qatar and the U.S. as possible alternative suppliers. It is in the U.S.’ interest to allow Qatar to export to specific markets. Doha’s supplies play a key role in Washington’s strategy of providing balance in the market.

At present, Qatari gas is a lot more competitive in Europe than U.S. gas. U.S. officials are aware that U.S. LNG is not competitive with Qatar LNG in EU market but what is important for the U.S. is to decrease the dependency of the EU on Russian natural gas and Gazprom’s monopoly in the EU market.

Increasing LNG supplies is the best way to reduce Europe’s dependency on Russian natural gas. Qatar is a major LNG provider and is trying to increase its share in the market. Russia is trying to keep its monopoly in Europe – in energy – and has used different pricing strategies to do this. Russia has sold a stake of its shares in Rosneft to Qatar, as Doha battles a blockade from a Saudi-led coalition. Russia is using a different pricing system in the EU market and has multiplied pipelines and LNG projects to increase and keep its share in EU natural gas market. It is expected that the EU natural gas market will bring a new competition era for the U.S. and Russia. In the short term and midterm, Russia will keep its share in the EU natural gas market, but if in the long term U.S. LNG can compete with Russia gas and Qatar LNG, it would be in favor of the EU as a consumer, and major LNG producers are trying to propose suitable prices to keep or maybe increase their share in the EU market.
www.dailysabah.com
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The Consequences Of U.S. Sanctions For Iran’s Oil Industry

Iran’s energy sector has often been the target of US-led sanctions, particularly in response to the perceived risk of a nuclear weapons program. However, after a brief thaw in relations and the lifting of certain restrictions, the United States imposed a new set of measures against Iran’s oil export industry in November 2018.

In October 2016, the peak of its crude oil exports, Iran was selling 2.44 million barrels a day. In 2017, Iran exports fell to 2.1 million barrels per day, earning revenues of around $40.4 billion. By September 2018, that number had dropped to 1.7 million barrels per day. U.S. policy makers are determined to drive Iran’s oil exports to zero and run Iran’s finances to the ground. Iran, meanwhile, needs to prevent its oil exports from falling below a million barrels per day. At the same time, it is hoping that the lack of supply in the market will increase prices as much as possible to allow for a natural balancing out.

A decrease in energy exports will certainly hurt Iran’s economy, and the government will likely struggle to mitigate the effects on ordinary life. Meanwhile, the United States will increase its own share of the global energy market, boosting its exports of liquefied natural gas to countries such as India and Turkey who would otherwise rely on Iran’s vast and near-by supply.

To continue exporting even at its diminished rate, Iran needs to attract capital and technology. Officials at the Ministry of Petroleum have frankly admitted that they need large amounts of capital to develop and maintain oil and gas fields or else Iran will fall well short of the goals of its sixth development plan. Iran hopes to reduce the national budget’s dependence on oil and gain a capacity of at least 4.7 million barrels, with 1.3 billion cubic meters of natural gas and gas condensate reaching 1.1 million barrels a day.

Iran requires around $100 billion in foreign investment for its oil, gas, and petrochemical sector. Most of Iran’s oil wells are in the second half of their lives, with eight percent of oil production dropping automatically each year. The country needs technology and capital from foreign countries in order to maintain, let alone increase, its oil efficiency. Once new sanctions are in place that target companies interested in investing in Iran, there will be even fewer possibilities for foreign investment. Furthermore, the ban on dollar deals with Iran raises the fear among financial institutions that they will feel the wrath of the Treasury Department.

Most technology-rich countries are interested in the investment opportunities the Iranian energy sector affords, from expanding oil wells to developing oil and gas technologies and petrochemical products. If geopolitics were not an issue, Iran would have many ready buyers for its energy. But Iran currently accounts for less than one percent of world trade in gas, despite its massive reserves.

However, every effort to revive the production capacity of oilfields requires high technology and foreign investment. Iran has signed a deal with the Russian company Zarubezhneft for the redevelopment of the Aban fields. It has also planned to sign contracts with Pertamina, an Indonesian state-run oil company, to operate the Mansouri oil field.

U.S. waivers to eight major Iranian oil importers provide the country with an opportunity to keep its share of the regional oil market for a limited time. However, it is inevitable that most of these countries will reduce oil imports from Iran in the first months of 2019, as all major Iranian oil buyers are looking to find alternatives for their supplies. U.S. sanctions present a steep risk to foreign firms otherwise looking to invest in Iran for they might be deprived of the technical cooperation of American companies and the financial resources of U.S. agencies and the U.S. government.

The U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear accord will undoubtedly hold the Iranian energy industry back from achieving its goals in terms of foreign investment and technology. After the re-imposition of sanctions, only Russian companies seem ready to continue work. Last year, the contract for the development of Aban and Persia Fields was signed with Zarubezhneft, but the Russian company has reportedly walked away from the deal. As recently as last month, meanwhile, Lukoil discussed further investment.

Russian companies are also investing in fields that—critically—provide no threat to Russia’s own energy goals. However, once Russian and Chinese companies begin playing an active role in oil and gas activities in Iran, questions regarding the nature and duration of contracts, and the technology used, will come to the fore—provided that these companies, too, succeed in withstanding U.S. diplomatic pressure.

 

https://lobelog.com

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US Wants Europe to Use Qatar Gas Instead of Russian Supplies

The US wants European countries to find other gas suppliers to Russia, with resource-rich Qatar as a possible alternative.

Deputy US Energy Secretary Dan Brouillette told Reuters that Washington was in talks with Doha to supply gas to Europe, and particularly countries that are reliant on Russian gas.

Russian gas accounts for around 60 percent of Berlin’s gas imports, with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline set to double Moscow’s export capacity to Germany.
US President Donald Trump has warned Germany that it would be “captive” to Russia if it relied on it as a gas supplier and urged Berlin to halt work on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

The move could see German companies face US sanctions.

Brouillette said he has held talks Qatar’s Minister of State for Energy Affairs Saad al-Kaabi about whether Doha could be an alternative gas supplies to Europe.

“We are talking to Minister Kaabi here about other markets, specifically Europe, to the extent that we can talk to the Qataris about supplying European markets with natural gas,” he said in an interview.
“They are very much interested in that and so are we – it’s very connected to deliberations with others we have around Nord Stream 2.”

He added that Qatar could help diversify the gas market in Europe, particularly with Doha’s investments in LNG export facilities.

“It is good for the national security of Europe. Cheap gas comes at a high price of freedom,” said Brouillette.

Last September, Qatar said it would invest $11.6 billion in Germany over the next five years including in a LNG terminal.

Omid Shokri Kalehsar, a Washington-based senior energy security analyst, told The New Arab that Washington has been encouraging European countries to diversify Russian-dominated energy supplies, with Qatar and the US as possible alternative suppliers.

“It is in the US’ interest allow Qatar to export to specific markets,” said Kalehsar, saying Doha’s supplies play a key role in Washington’s strategy of providing balance in the market.

“Increasing LNG supplies is the best way to reduce [Europe’s] dependency on Russian natural gas…. Qatar is a major LNG provider and is trying to increase its share in the market. Russia is trying to keep its monopoly in Europe – with energy – and has used different pricing strategies to do this.”

Russia has sold a stake of its shares in Rosneft to Qatar, as Doha battles a blockade from a Saudi-led coalition.
Turkey is also boosting its relationship with Russia with the construction of the TurkStream pipelines.

https://www.alaraby.co.uk

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Qatar’s Withdrawal from OPEC not a Good Sign

 

As Qatar’s withdrawal from OPEC takes effect today, the geopolitics of energy is changing. Each major energy producer is trying to take more shares in the world energy market. Political tensions between major oil and gas producers would affect regional and world energy markets. As the world’s largest exporter of LNG, Qatar gets the most revenue from it.

U.S. sanctions against Iran give an opportunity to Saudi Arabia which can use its producing capacity to produce and export more oil in the region in an attempt to weaken Iran’s position in OPEC.

A high oil price is not good for major oil consumers. The world oil market has been worrying about U.S.’sanctions against Iran.Regional tensions are one of the factors affecting members of the international organization. The tensions between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which began in June 2017, would prevent Qatar from withdrawing from Saudi Arabia’s shadow even in an organization like OPEC. Qatar with production of 0.6 million bpd is not a major actor among OPEC members.

 

After a sharp rise in the price of crude oil to more than 100 U.S. dollars between 2011 and 2012, the price of crude oil gradually shrank in 2016 and reached a low of less than 40 dollars. The organization was unable to find a solution for the crisis, which had a huge impact on its member states.

Oil producers were able to cut crude prices to 70 dollars a barrel in mid-2018 with a drop in supply. But once again the policy of the largest oil producer Saudi Arabia, along with the White House’s political and economic measures and the gap in the queue of supporters for a reduction in production, led to a sharp drop in crude oil to about 50 dollars.

In a situation where the future of oil demand is not clear in the long run, the market management method and the call for Russia to counterbalance the U.S. are also challenges to OPEC.

South Pars Gas field (North Dome) shared by Iran and Qatar is a major source of Qatar LNG production. It is the largest gas field in the world. Qatar has made it clear that by 2024 it would have used South Pars to produce 110 million tons per year.

At present, Qatar produces 77 million tons per year. Qatar’s withdrawal from OPEC is a good opportunity to increase its production from this shared filed, Iran is unable to attract more foreign technology and financial investment and Qatar’s oil production in South Pars is more than that of Iran.

According to Reuters in November, Australia grabbed the world’s biggest LNG exporter crown from Qatar in November. According to statistics, Australia produced 6.8 million tons of LNG in November, out of which 0.6 million tons were exported from Qatar.

Australia’s LNG exports rose by 19 percent in November compared to October while Qatar’s exports dropped 3 percent in November compared to the previous month, the country’s fourth consecutive decline for the year in exports.

It is not the first time that an OPEC member has withdrawn from the organization. The main point is that OPEC’s decisions are not followed by major oil suppliers and Qatar’s withdrawal is certainly not good for OPEC. As Qatar is not a major oil producer among OPEC members, it cannot cause any major changes in the oil price.

The major factor in the oil market is demand and supply. At present, the oil market is faced with oversupply which leads to a low oil price. Qatar’s withdrawal from OPEC is not a good sign for its future. If OPEC is interested in playing an important role in the world oil market, it needs cooperation and coherence among all members.

If major members continue to be inefficient in OPEC decision-making, there will not be a promising future for the organization. OPEC’s weak position favors major energy consumers. Obviously, OPEC does not have the same influence on oil prices as it used to be. Its strength has slowly weakened due to the growth of producers such as the United States and Russia.

 

https://news.cgtn.com

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Iran to Export 1mn bdp of Oil Despite US Sanctions

Qatar will withdraw from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Persian Gulf nation’s Energy Minister Saad Sherida al-Kaabi announced.

The decision to quit the bloc of 15 oil-producing countries that account for a significant percentage of the world’s oil production was confirmed by Qatar Petroleum, the state oil company, last Monday.

Following is an interview with Omid Shokri Kalehsar is a Istanbul based Senior Energy Security and Policy Analyst on the issue:

What are the reasons behind Qatar’s decision to withdraw from OPEC? Is it politically and economically right decision?

It seems that Qatar is interested to be more active in LNG market and keeps its place as world’s first LNG producer and exporter. But it is possible for Qatar to export more oil if Qatar withdraw from OPEC. It should be noted that there is a major challenge between Qatar and Saudi Arabia as OPEC major producers and actor. It is possible for Iran’s private sector to buy Iran crude oil from Energy Exchange and sell it to Qatar energy firms and Qatar firms after Qatar withdrawal from OPEC sell it oil to regional and world market.
Is there any relation between Qatar’s decision and the Saudi policy in the organization?

Some analysts believe that Qatar decision to withdraw from OPEC is reaction to Saudi Policy in OPEC. Qatar is against Saudi Policy in the OPEC, Saudi Arabia after Khashoggi was under pressure.  It should be noted that Qatar-Saudi relations faced major challenge after a Saudi-led coalition imposed blockade Qatar.
Any relation between Trump’s anti-OPEC policies and Doha decision?

 Stability in world oil and low price in oil market is in favor of oil consumers and US. US is against any

country or organization which decided to increase oil production or increase oil price. Trump administration can be expected to continue its policy toward OPEC and will ask OPEC member states to produce more oil to keep oil price down.

How do you see the future of the 60 years old organization?

Major OPEC oil producers must solve problems if they want OPEC to be one of the key factor in world oil market. Every country which has more production has a power in OPEC.
Cooperation and coordination between major oil producers and non-major oil producers is required. If OPEC members need to continue their role in world oil market, they require cooperation between themselves. Without cooperation and mutual understanding between all OPEC members, there is no clear future for OPEC and this organization may face serious challenges in the future.

At the present moment which Iran is under US and its regional allies’ pressure such as Saudi Arabia and UAE to cut Iran’s oil export to zero, will Doha withdrawal from OPEC affect the US goals toward Iran?

As I mentioned before in my interviews and papers it is not easy to drop Iran oil export to zero. Iran during sanction era will be able to export average 1000000 bpd and 300000 bpd condensate bpd.  Iran oil export’s drop is in favor of rest major oil exporters and all major exporters are satisfied with new sanctions imposed against Iran oil exports.

How will be possible reaction of Russia and China to Qatar’s withdraw? Will this decision affect China’s One road-One belt project? 

Russia has a plan to be a key player in LNG market. Russia is careful about all major oil and gas producers, Russia wants them to lose their share in world energy market and plans to increase its own share. China as energy costumer has its own strategy toward energy producer countries in the Middle East such as Qatar. China in promotion of its “Going out Strategy” encourages energy companies to invest in Qatar’s energy sector mainly in natural gas fields. Chinese officials have repeatedly stated that China’s common goal from One road One Belt project is to create dialogue, help to bring peace and stability in the Middle East, link East and West Asia and joint development, eliminate obstacles and biases. Arab Countries and Qatar has special position in this project. According to Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of China, Arab countries cooperation in One Road One Belt will bring Peace in the Middle East. China is interested to keep stability in the region to import oil and gas freely from the region. energy security is key factor in China foreign policy. Last September PetroChina inked its biggest Qatar LNG deal as U.S. Trade at Risk and it seems that China will increase its investment in Qatar energy sector to promote Qatari cooperation in One Road One Belt project.

Omid Shokri Kalehsar is a Senior Energy Security and Policy Analyst, Istanbul.

https://en.mehrnews.com

Interview by payman Yazdani

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The Effects Of U.S. Sanctions On Iran’s Natural Gas Projects

Iran holds the second largest natural gas reserves in the world. Despite this advantage, the country controls less than one percent of the world’s natural gas market. Nevertheless, Iran is the third largest gas producer and, over the past few years, has focused on increasing its share of the global gas market. By the end of 2017, according to the National Iranian Gas Company, Iran was producing 800 million cubic meters per day. Iran’s short-term intention is to increase the volume of gas available for export by 365 million cubic meters per day by 2021.

Exporting natural gas takes a back seat in terms of priorities to more immediate economic considerations like boosting investment into oil fields, satisfying domestic consumption, and expanding gas-based industries. Iran has 50 independent gas fields, of which currently only 23 are developed and producing. Iran’s largest gas field at South Pars, with reserves of 14 trillion cubic meters, accounts for around 40 percent of the country’s gas reserves. In 2017, Iran produced 130 billion cubic meters of natural gas from this field. Iran plans to complete Phase 11 in the next two years so that it can produce about 180 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. But based on estimates from the Ministry of Oil, South Pars will experience a significant drop in pressure, known as the “dew point,” probably around 2023.

In 2015, after the signing of the nuclear agreement, Iranian officials repeated calls for an injection of around $100 billion in foreign investment into the country’s oil, gas, and petrochemical sector. Most of Iran’s oil wells have entered the second half of their lives. With 8 percent of oil production dropping automatically year on year, Iran desperately needs technology and capital from foreign countries just to stabilize its oil production. The U.S. ban on companies engaging in dollar deals with Iran, however, means that large financial institutions risk heavy fines from the Treasury Department, thus hampering any progress in Iran’s ability to gain such investments through formal and legal restrictions.

Iran signed major agreements with foreign companies in the natural gas sector, including contracts for the development of the 11th phase of the South Pars field with both French and Chinese partners designed to increase the production capacity of the field by 56 million cubic meters per day. After the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal, however, the French company Total abandoned the contract, and China National Petroleum Corporation officials stated that only they would remain in Iran’s natural gas sector. However, Chinese companies do not have a good record in Iran’s oil industry. For instance, several Chinese companies have delayed work in the Azadegan Fields for no good reason. Also, Chinese firms with interests in the United States or in U.S.-funded projects may be reluctant to invest in Iran.

According to Mohammad Hassan Adeli, former secretary general of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, sanctions are one of the main reasons for Iran’s failure in its gas export policy. However, other factors include the long process of achieving consensus on big decisions in Iran and a prevailing opinion among Iranian policy makers that gas should only be consumed domestically or turned into petrochemical products.

Iran has plans to increase its export of natural gas to other countries. For instance, Iran and Pakistan began work on a pipeline in March 2013 that would send 1.5 million cubic meters per day natural gas to Pakistan. However, US sanctions against Iran may force Pakistan to seek a less controversial alternative. Iran is also eyeing the European market. But gas exports to Europe face two major problems. Firstly, traditionally, Russia has dominated this market and Iran cannot hope to play as large a role as Russia in supplying gas to Europe. Second, in order to export Iranian gas via pipeline to Europe, Iran must secure transit through several intermediary countries.

Given recent developments in the energy market—not to mention the sanctions imposed by the Trump government—attracting foreign capital and technology to the Iranian energy industry, especially the natural gas industry, carries none of the optimism of previous years.

Foreign private companies have enough financial resources to make a splash in the Iranian market. But attracting foreign investment requires a suitable legal framework and an efficient and fast decision process, as well as political stability. In addition, Iran needs to revise its foreign policy and solve its issues with neighbors as well as the West. With neither foreign technology nor capital, Iran will not be able to produce more oil and gas to export to neighbors, let alone export to the EU.

At present, major natural gas producers such as Russia and the United States have made huge investments in their own natural gas sectors. If these major natural gas producers control the regional and world gas markets, Iran is likely to struggle to find importers. Boosting Iran’s share of the market from one percent to 10 percent, as the government would like to do, is possible only with foreign investment, which requires a reduction of political risk in the country and an effort to eliminate tension with neighboring countries.

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Washington boosts LNG with Iran in sanctions crosshairs

The shale gas revolution has had a staggering effect on the world energy market, shifting many prior assumptions regarding the geopolitics of energy.
Whereas in 2000 and the first years of the new millennium, shale oil and gas accounted for just one percent of all fossil fuels produced in the United States, the country has now moved towards energy self-sufficiency and is taking on the role of an exporter.

Whereas the Obama administration was a major force in fostering this development as a means of freeing the country from foreign dependency through diversification, in tandem with increased green energy supplies, the Trump administration seems to have sought to focus on energy in a more traditional approach.

The shale gas revolution and consequent US energy boom finally meant that a static fact of world energy geopolitics, – ie: that the US was dependent on oil mainly imported from the Middle East – could be cast aside. The US is now energy self-sufficient and free to export Liquefied Natural Gas to neighbours and allies around the world, and thus has added to Washington’s political flexibility.

The uptick in gas production in the US has already decreased LNG prices in the EU and Asia and thus presents a challenge to the old energy order

Not surprisingly, this turn of events is being monitored closely by other energy exporters.

The US is already using its energy exports to reduce the EU’s dependency on Russian gas, while exerting pressure on its allies to see it as an alternative to Iranian natural gas.

The uptick in gas production in the US has already decreased LNG prices in the EU and Asia and thus presents a challenge to the old energy order. In terms of US national security then, the energy boom can be examined from two perspectives, first, its implications for US energy security and second, its implications for the wider field of international relations and its geopolitics.

 

US withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal 

Iran’s economy and energy sector has been devastated by the US and EU sanctions brought against it due to Iran’s former attempt to build a nuclear programme. Sanctions have not only scuppered Iran’s chances of success in achieving its energy goals but also have forced Iran to become more proactive in consolidating regional relations.

Since Washington’s departure from the JCPOA agreement, energy companies who had only just began to consider re-entering Iran have withdrawn in anticipation of further sanctions. Few international banks or financial institutes are willing to participate in energy projects in Iran under such conditions.
The US is interested in reducing Iran’s role in regional and global energy markets, with Washington often declaring a wish to bring Iranian oil production down to zero. It is a fact that American sanctions against Iran’s energy sector have vastly reduced the country’s production capacity. US sanctions have also wrought severe harm in terms of technology and finance.

The US plans to increase LNG exports to countries which depend on Iranian hydrocarbons in an attempt to wean these countries off their reliance. But some analysts believe the US oil and gas sector is unlikely to gain Iran’s share of the market, as technically, Iran’s export oil grades are heavier and sourer than the light, sweet crude exported from the US.

 

Following the US withdrawal from the treaty, the country further cut imports of oil from Iran. Japan now imports 5.5 percent of its oil from Iran, according to the Japanese Ministry of Economy and Trade. In August, Japan was receiving 17,775 barrels per day and bought 3.39 million barrels of crude in one month.

Japan called for an exemption from the US embargo on Iran, which was granted by the Trump administration – but only for six months. Part of Iran’s share of oil is expected to fall victim to an influx of LNG exports and US gas condensate onto Japan’s market. Sanctions against Iran’s energy industry have not only reduced Iran’s oil and gas production capacity, but also reduced Iran’s share of the global energy market. The rising lack of investment in the Iranian oil and gas industry is one particularly immediate result of renewed sanctions.

Reducing oil production capacity and, consequently, reducing Iran’s oil export potential will force Iran to find loans and facilities from banks and global financial institutions in order to develop its facilities – yet it is clear that new US sanctions will challenge Iran’s ability to retain much of its oil production capacity regardless.

Given the increase in natural gas producers and LNGs on the market, the US energy boom provides a good opportunity for Iran’s rivals – not least the US itself – from moving in on Iran’s share of the regional and global energy market.

The increase in US oil and shale gas production has made Iran more pressured to find new markets, yet the country does not have the capacity to produce LNG, thus competing with the US, and it is unclear when the capital and technology needed to complete its LNG project units will be provided.

The US superiority in terms of advanced technology, research, investment, and diplomatic reach ensure it will retain a high position in the world energy market, while Iran will likely flounder further. If Iran and the US agree on current political and security problems, Iran may gain the foreign capital and technology needed to recover some of its oil and gas production capacity.

Energy continues to play an important role in US foreign policy, with implications not only on relations with designated rivals but also allies across the world.

Energy exports play a key role in US relations with its neighbours and allies, and are a key tool in fostering and furthering relations with others. Energy exports as a means of expanding relations and helping US allies in South Asia and Europe are sure to lead to interesting geopolitical developments, and US LNG exports are most likely to be effective in reducing Iranian oil exports to Japan and South Korea.

Turkey and India


Turkey is a major purchaser of Iranian natural gas. Turkey has huge investments in LNG storage facilities and plans to increase its share of LNG in the domestic energy market. In 2015, Turkey began to import LNG from the US, and is now the second-largest importer of US LNG in Europe.

An increase in US and Qatari LNG – alongside new natural gas transit projects such as TANAP and the Turkish Stream – means that Iran may be largely sidelined by Turkey in the near future. Similarly, India has also signed a 20-year agreement to be supplied with US LNG, also ensuring a reduction of Iranian supplies to the Indian energy market over a similar period.

South Korea 

Seoul is one of the main customers of Iranian gas condensate. More than 55 percent of Iran’s gas condensate is exported to South Korea. According to official statistics from the Ministry of Oil, Iranian gas condensate exports in 2017 numbered 428,000 barrels per day on average.

Since the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, major Korean companies importing Iranian oil and gas condensate have cut imports from Iran. In the first six months of 2018, the Hanwa Total Petrochemical Company, the largest importer of Iranian gas condensate, imported 15.92 million barrels from Iran, but since August has reduced its imports to one-third, in favour of supplies from Qatar and the United States.


Japan

Japan is another main consumer of Iranian oil in East Asia. According to the Japanese Petroleum Association, in 2017 the country imported 172,216 bpd of oil from Iran, down 24.2 percent from the previous year. Iran’s oil accounted for 5.3 percent of total oil imports to Japan’s refineries in 2017.

Japan called for an exemption from the US embargo on Iran, which was granted by the Trump administration – but only for six months

Following the US withdrawal from the treaty, the country further cut imports of oil from Iran. Japan now imports 5.5 percent of its oil from Iran, according to the Japanese Ministry of Economy and Trade. In August, Japan was receiving 17,775 barrels per day and bought 3.39 million barrels of crude in one month.

Japan called for an exemption from the US embargo on Iran, which was granted by the Trump administration – but only for six months. Part of Iran’s share of oil is expected to fall victim to an influx of LNG exports and US gas condensate onto Japan’s market.

Sanctions against Iran’s energy industry have not only reduced Iran’s oil and gas production capacity, but also reduced Iran’s share of the global energy market. The rising lack of investment in the Iranian oil and gas industry is one particularly immediate result of renewed sanctions.

Reducing oil production capacity and, consequently, reducing Iran’s oil export potential will force Iran to find loans and facilities from banks and global financial institutions in order to develop its facilities – yet it is clear that new US sanctions will challenge Iran’s ability to retain much of its oil production capacity regardless.

Given the increase in natural gas producers and LNGs on the market, the US energy boom provides a good opportunity for Iran’s rivals – not least the US itself – from moving in on Iran’s share of the regional and global energy market.

The increase in US oil and shale gas production has made Iran more pressured to find new markets, yet the country does not have the capacity to produce LNG, thus competing with the US, and it is unclear when the capital and technology needed to complete its LNG project units will be provided.

The US superiority in terms of advanced technology, research, investment, and diplomatic reach ensure it will retain a high position in the world energy market, while Iran will likely flounder further. If Iran and the US agree on current political and security problems, Iran may gain the foreign capital and technology needed to recover some of its oil and gas production capacity.
Energy continues to play an important role in US foreign policy, with implications not only on relations with designated rivals but also allies across the world.

www.alaraby.co.uk/

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