Iranian-Indian Energy Relations Under Sanctions

Since it has huge oil and gas reserves and is geographically quite close, Iran is ideally placed to provide energy to India, and thus the country is Iran’s second largest oil market after China. Even at the height of the U.S. sanctions on Iran’s energy sector, India continued to import oil from the country. The relationship between Iran and India has expanded rapidly in recent years. After the 2015 nuclear deal, with the lifting of sanctions in various fields, especially energy, economic and commercial links between Iran and India expanded dramatically.

With new sanctions on the horizon, Iran provided significant discounts to Indian importers last summer. Thus, the volume of August imports was 56 percent higher than the previous August. So far, India is one of the countries exempted from secondary sanctions that the Trump administration is imposing on states doing business with Iran. But oil prices are expected to rise nevertheless, which will adversely affect India as the third largest oil importer in the world.

Although sanctions on banking prevented New Delhi from transferring money from the sale of oil to Iran in time, links were preserved thanks to strategies established during the previous round of sanctions. At that time, 55 percent of the proceeds from the sale of Iranian oil to India were deposited in euros and 45 percent in rupee in UCO Bank, an Indian financial institution, after which most of the money was transferred to Iran. This time around, UCO Bank is reluctant to serve as the conduit for funds, and India has opted to pay Iran in rupees through the Mumbai branch of an Iranian bank.

India has launched a major effort to invest in petrochemicals, chemical fertilizer, and the other upstream industries of its own oil industry. The country’s Oil and Gas Minister Dharmendra Pradhan has announced plans to invest $20 billion in Iranian oil and gas infrastructure. Iran, aiming to gain a competitive edge over other suppliers, has delivered oil at reduced prices to India, offered a longer period of credit to pay for oil purchases, and is transporting the oil almost for free. In addition, many Indian refineries are equipped to match Iranian refineries, so they cannot easily rely on other suppliers. Iran has also offered to cover the insurance for tankers that carry Iranian oil to India in lieu of an exemption from international financial institutions.

The port of Chabahar is the best, the closest, and the least costly route for Iran to reach global markets and promote the development of neighboring countries. India has committed to invest $500 million to develop Chabahar port. Iran and Afghanistan, meanwhile, want to establish an international freight corridor through this port, and several Indian wheat shipments have already gone to Afghanistan through Chabahar. New sanctions against Iran, however, threaten the success of the Chabahar project by not only preventing countries and companies from trading with Iran but also by threatening sanctions on financial institutions that engage with Iran. These sanctions will reduce the flow of capital and business to the port.

On November 7, the United States announced that it would waive sanctions on certain parts of the Chabahar port, along with the Chabahar-Afghanistan railway project and Iranian petroleum exports to Afghanistan. Since Islamabad is not allowing India to use Pakistani territory for direct business with Afghanistan, Chabahar is important for Indian access not only to Iran but to Afghanistan and beyond. The diversification of energy resources is a key pillar of Indian energy policy. If sanctions continue to punish the Iranian energy sector after the U.S. waivers expire, India will reduce oil imports from Iran and increase imports from Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Indian oil imports from Iran were expected to grow by 31 percent year-on-year, reaching 500,000 barrels per day in the fiscal year beginning April 1, 2018. Iran understands India’s problems in dealing with an unpredictable energy market and will do everything it can to ensure the security of India’s energy supply. India’s relations with Iran are also complicated by the impasse over Indian investment into developing Iran’s Farzad B gas field.

China has been one of the strongest drivers of closer relations between Iran and India. An economic corridor between China and Pakistan and the former’s investments into the port of Gwadar is a common geopolitical challenge for both India and Iran. The economic corridor is designed to limit Indian operations in the western regions of the Indian Ocean and the Oman Sea. An expanded Gwadar port, meanwhile, undermines the potential of the Chabahar port and allows Pakistan to challenge its regional rival, India, in the area of Afghanistan.

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Iran to Export 1mn bdp of Oil Despite US Sanctions

Qatar will withdraw from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Persian Gulf nation’s Energy Minister Saad Sherida al-Kaabi announced.

The decision to quit the bloc of 15 oil-producing countries that account for a significant percentage of the world’s oil production was confirmed by Qatar Petroleum, the state oil company, last Monday.

Following is an interview with Omid Shokri Kalehsar is a Istanbul based Senior Energy Security and Policy Analyst on the issue:

What are the reasons behind Qatar’s decision to withdraw from OPEC? Is it politically and economically right decision?

It seems that Qatar is interested to be more active in LNG market and keeps its place as world’s first LNG producer and exporter. But it is possible for Qatar to export more oil if Qatar withdraw from OPEC. It should be noted that there is a major challenge between Qatar and Saudi Arabia as OPEC major producers and actor. It is possible for Iran’s private sector to buy Iran crude oil from Energy Exchange and sell it to Qatar energy firms and Qatar firms after Qatar withdrawal from OPEC sell it oil to regional and world market.
Is there any relation between Qatar’s decision and the Saudi policy in the organization?

Some analysts believe that Qatar decision to withdraw from OPEC is reaction to Saudi Policy in OPEC. Qatar is against Saudi Policy in the OPEC, Saudi Arabia after Khashoggi was under pressure.  It should be noted that Qatar-Saudi relations faced major challenge after a Saudi-led coalition imposed blockade Qatar.
Any relation between Trump’s anti-OPEC policies and Doha decision?

 Stability in world oil and low price in oil market is in favor of oil consumers and US. US is against any

country or organization which decided to increase oil production or increase oil price. Trump administration can be expected to continue its policy toward OPEC and will ask OPEC member states to produce more oil to keep oil price down.

How do you see the future of the 60 years old organization?

Major OPEC oil producers must solve problems if they want OPEC to be one of the key factor in world oil market. Every country which has more production has a power in OPEC.
Cooperation and coordination between major oil producers and non-major oil producers is required. If OPEC members need to continue their role in world oil market, they require cooperation between themselves. Without cooperation and mutual understanding between all OPEC members, there is no clear future for OPEC and this organization may face serious challenges in the future.

At the present moment which Iran is under US and its regional allies’ pressure such as Saudi Arabia and UAE to cut Iran’s oil export to zero, will Doha withdrawal from OPEC affect the US goals toward Iran?

As I mentioned before in my interviews and papers it is not easy to drop Iran oil export to zero. Iran during sanction era will be able to export average 1000000 bpd and 300000 bpd condensate bpd.  Iran oil export’s drop is in favor of rest major oil exporters and all major exporters are satisfied with new sanctions imposed against Iran oil exports.

How will be possible reaction of Russia and China to Qatar’s withdraw? Will this decision affect China’s One road-One belt project? 

Russia has a plan to be a key player in LNG market. Russia is careful about all major oil and gas producers, Russia wants them to lose their share in world energy market and plans to increase its own share. China as energy costumer has its own strategy toward energy producer countries in the Middle East such as Qatar. China in promotion of its “Going out Strategy” encourages energy companies to invest in Qatar’s energy sector mainly in natural gas fields. Chinese officials have repeatedly stated that China’s common goal from One road One Belt project is to create dialogue, help to bring peace and stability in the Middle East, link East and West Asia and joint development, eliminate obstacles and biases. Arab Countries and Qatar has special position in this project. According to Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of China, Arab countries cooperation in One Road One Belt will bring Peace in the Middle East. China is interested to keep stability in the region to import oil and gas freely from the region. energy security is key factor in China foreign policy. Last September PetroChina inked its biggest Qatar LNG deal as U.S. Trade at Risk and it seems that China will increase its investment in Qatar energy sector to promote Qatari cooperation in One Road One Belt project.

Omid Shokri Kalehsar is a Senior Energy Security and Policy Analyst, Istanbul.

https://en.mehrnews.com

Interview by payman Yazdani

News Code 140293
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The Effects Of U.S. Sanctions On Iran’s Natural Gas Projects

Iran holds the second largest natural gas reserves in the world. Despite this advantage, the country controls less than one percent of the world’s natural gas market. Nevertheless, Iran is the third largest gas producer and, over the past few years, has focused on increasing its share of the global gas market. By the end of 2017, according to the National Iranian Gas Company, Iran was producing 800 million cubic meters per day. Iran’s short-term intention is to increase the volume of gas available for export by 365 million cubic meters per day by 2021.

Exporting natural gas takes a back seat in terms of priorities to more immediate economic considerations like boosting investment into oil fields, satisfying domestic consumption, and expanding gas-based industries. Iran has 50 independent gas fields, of which currently only 23 are developed and producing. Iran’s largest gas field at South Pars, with reserves of 14 trillion cubic meters, accounts for around 40 percent of the country’s gas reserves. In 2017, Iran produced 130 billion cubic meters of natural gas from this field. Iran plans to complete Phase 11 in the next two years so that it can produce about 180 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. But based on estimates from the Ministry of Oil, South Pars will experience a significant drop in pressure, known as the “dew point,” probably around 2023.

In 2015, after the signing of the nuclear agreement, Iranian officials repeated calls for an injection of around $100 billion in foreign investment into the country’s oil, gas, and petrochemical sector. Most of Iran’s oil wells have entered the second half of their lives. With 8 percent of oil production dropping automatically year on year, Iran desperately needs technology and capital from foreign countries just to stabilize its oil production. The U.S. ban on companies engaging in dollar deals with Iran, however, means that large financial institutions risk heavy fines from the Treasury Department, thus hampering any progress in Iran’s ability to gain such investments through formal and legal restrictions.

Iran signed major agreements with foreign companies in the natural gas sector, including contracts for the development of the 11th phase of the South Pars field with both French and Chinese partners designed to increase the production capacity of the field by 56 million cubic meters per day. After the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal, however, the French company Total abandoned the contract, and China National Petroleum Corporation officials stated that only they would remain in Iran’s natural gas sector. However, Chinese companies do not have a good record in Iran’s oil industry. For instance, several Chinese companies have delayed work in the Azadegan Fields for no good reason. Also, Chinese firms with interests in the United States or in U.S.-funded projects may be reluctant to invest in Iran.

According to Mohammad Hassan Adeli, former secretary general of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, sanctions are one of the main reasons for Iran’s failure in its gas export policy. However, other factors include the long process of achieving consensus on big decisions in Iran and a prevailing opinion among Iranian policy makers that gas should only be consumed domestically or turned into petrochemical products.

Iran has plans to increase its export of natural gas to other countries. For instance, Iran and Pakistan began work on a pipeline in March 2013 that would send 1.5 million cubic meters per day natural gas to Pakistan. However, US sanctions against Iran may force Pakistan to seek a less controversial alternative. Iran is also eyeing the European market. But gas exports to Europe face two major problems. Firstly, traditionally, Russia has dominated this market and Iran cannot hope to play as large a role as Russia in supplying gas to Europe. Second, in order to export Iranian gas via pipeline to Europe, Iran must secure transit through several intermediary countries.

Given recent developments in the energy market—not to mention the sanctions imposed by the Trump government—attracting foreign capital and technology to the Iranian energy industry, especially the natural gas industry, carries none of the optimism of previous years.

Foreign private companies have enough financial resources to make a splash in the Iranian market. But attracting foreign investment requires a suitable legal framework and an efficient and fast decision process, as well as political stability. In addition, Iran needs to revise its foreign policy and solve its issues with neighbors as well as the West. With neither foreign technology nor capital, Iran will not be able to produce more oil and gas to export to neighbors, let alone export to the EU.

At present, major natural gas producers such as Russia and the United States have made huge investments in their own natural gas sectors. If these major natural gas producers control the regional and world gas markets, Iran is likely to struggle to find importers. Boosting Iran’s share of the market from one percent to 10 percent, as the government would like to do, is possible only with foreign investment, which requires a reduction of political risk in the country and an effort to eliminate tension with neighboring countries.

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The Future of Iran-Pakistan Energy Relations Seems Dim

With the re-imposition of sanctions on Iran, it is not just the Islamic Republic’s global, but regional energy links which have been shaken, spelling bad tidings for future economic and political cooperation. Alternatives to Iran’s drastically under invested energy sector abound for those countries which, like Pakistan, are undertaking serious efforts to make up for their own deficits. What can the current state of relations between Pakistan and Iran tell us about the future of regional energy relations?

 

With a population of almost 200 million, Pakistan ranks as the twenty-sixth largest economy in the world. This demographic advantage brings with it greater urgency in matters regarding energy. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, 62% of Pakistan’s population is dependent on biofuels, such as wood, for cooking and heating. Given this high rate of dependency, the extent to which whole swaths of the country are lacking in electricity and gas becomes clear.

 

Recognizing the needs of the population, the Pakistani government has proposed a plan to increase domestic energy production and hydrocarbon exploration, increase natural gas imports, diversify the combined capacity of installed electricity production, improve domestic standards for energy efficiency, and gradually eliminate natural gas subsidies.

 

Iran shares land and maritime borders with several countries, such as Turkmenistan and Qatar, which are rich in gas resources. Others in close proximity, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Armenia, as well as the UAE, Kuwait, and Oman, are still in need of natural gas suppliers. In addition, Iran is home to a wide network of pipelines which (with the exception of 90 to 100 days during the winter when domestic demand peaks) has the capacity to transport gas to countries in need of additional sources of gas for much of the year.

 

Thus, in many ways, Iran is ideally positioned to benefit from both transportation and swap deals, provided there is active cooperation through diplomacy and allowing the energy industry representation in regional initiatives. The realization of this potential, however, is evidently being held back by the unfavorable international conditions to which Iran has fallen victim, not to mention its own weak attempts at energy diplomacy initiatives and active participation in energy transmission projects.

 

In 1990, Pakistan began negotiations with Iran for gas exports. At the same time, India’s growing energy demands led to joint support for what was termed the Peace Pipeline, which signaled a new chapter in India and Pakistan’s relations under which the two rivals would come together to enjoy the mutual benefits of Iranian resources. In 2011, however, due to U.S. pressure, India withdrew its support for the Peace Pipeline, an unfortunate development for Iran which had hoped the pipeline would serve to develop and expand its friendship and cooperation in the region.

 

According to the initial agreement, Iran would have transported natural gas via a 2700-kilometer pipeline through Pakistan to India. It was anticipated that in the event of a final agreement, 1100 kilometers of the pipeline would be constructed in Iran, 1000 kilometers in Pakistan, and 600 kilometers in India. The plans projected that 150 million cubic meters of gas would be exported daily to the subcontinent: 90 million cubic meters for India, and 60 million cubic meters for Pakistan.

 

Iran completed its own extension of the pipeline to deliver natural gas from South Pars to the Iran-Pakistan border by December 2014, long before the deadline. However, Islamabad has still not taken steps to comply with its own obligations, and no practical steps towards the construction of the project in Pakistan’s territory have been undertaken.

 

Diversification of energy resources represents a major pillar of Pakistan’s national energy policy. At present, Pakistan is planning to import natural gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) from new sources, as well as importing electricity from Turkmenistan. Renewable energy will also play an important role in Pakistan’s energy basket in the coming years.

 

Running Rings Around Iran: The TAPI Project

 

One of Pakistan’s alternatives in diversifying its energy resources comes in the form of the TAPI project, which was designed to deliver Turkmen natural gas to India via Afghanistan and Pakistan. The project was first conceived with U.S. support in 1990 as a means of boosting regional links while circumventing Iran.The cost of the project is estimated to range from $7 billion – $9 billion. TAPI is projected to transfer 90 million cubic meters of gas per day along the route of Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India.

The Asian Development Bank is the project’s primary sponsor, along with the World Bank, the United States, and India. In political terms, the United States and its allies, including NATO, are the most important political supporters of this pipeline.Washington’s approach to the pipeline is based on its long-term strategic goals in the region.

 

Through this economic project, the geopolitics of the region may be bolstered in the US’s favor and pave the way for the establishment of permanent bases in Afghanistan, and thus a higher presence along the borders of Iran. By removing Iran from the thriving and growing energy market of the region, the United States will cause irreparable damage to the Iranian economy and political influence in the region.

 

LNG and The Post-Pipeline Future

 

Natural gas and LNG now form 50% of Pakistan’s total energy basket, and this will increase in the coming years due to Pakistan’s new agreements with LNG suppliers. At present, Pakistan imports LNG from Qatar since a $21 billion deal was signed in February 2015 to buy liquefied natural gas from Doha. Under the agreement, Pakistan will receive 500 million cubic feet of LNG per day. The Pakistani energy crisis will likely be alleviated by imports of Qatari gas, but those imports will not resolve the problem completely.

 

Meanwhile, the shale gas revolution that the U.S. experienced in the early 2000s has provided an opportunity for the country to transition from energy importer to energy exporter – cementing its role with increasing success since 2017. 3.166 million cubic feet of these U.S. exports are planned for Pakistan. U.S. natural gas is key to diversifying the nation’s energy supplies while expanding trade relations.

 

The U.S.’s reliance on the shale gas revolution and increasing LNG exports to expand and develop relations with neighbors and allies provide Pakistan with an enthusiastic alternative supplier also looking to divert Iranian gas interests. The shale gas revolution and LNG exports provide a new tool for the U.S. to wean allied nations off of Iranian oil and gas. In 2018, Pakistan has imported 13 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of LNG from the U.S. — a huge increase compared to the previous year’s figure of 3.2 Bcf.Seeking new, more robust opportunities afforded by sea channels, Russian energy giant Gazprom is considering the possibility of supplying 5-7 million tons of LNG annually to Pakistan. In July 2014, Pakistan and Gazprom signed an agreement to construct three LNG terminals, with the first shipment arriving on July 2015. Currently, as noted above, Pakistan is increasing its LNG imports from Qatar, and hopes to do the same with Gazprom’s gas authorities; work is on-going to find ways of boosting Russian LNG exports to Pakistan.

 

In 2016, Pakistan and Azerbaijan agreed to sign deals in various fields including those that would allow Azerbaijan to supply the country with electricity, crude oil and refined petroleum products, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), and LNG. Pakistan is increasing its LNG intake amid increasing demand for gas and decline in production. In 2017, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) won a tender to supply Pakistan with two LNG cargoes to be delivered in October according to Pakistan LNG. SOCAR began delivering LNG to Pakistan in October. The LNG was delivered in two cargoes, each carrying 140,000 cubic meters.

 

Natural Gas Price, Electricity Generation

 

The cost of Iranian natural gas is of major concern to Pakistan, as the latter needs Iranian natural gas to generate electricity. At present, Pakistan’s demand outstrips its supply by between 4000-7000 megawatts. However, the cost of Iran’s gas as proposed by the IP project is too expensive for use in power plants. The electricity generated from Pakistan’s power plants, mainly located in the Baluchistan province, costs $3.5 per one million units, while the cost for Iran’s gas is $12.

 

Thanks to the China-Pakistan economic corridor, Islamabad will soon be able to generate electricity from coal-fired power plants. The goal of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project is to turn the Gwadar Port into an energy hub in the region. Islamabad is also trying to address its electricity shortage in part through other projects such as the Casa 1000 project. The Casa 1000 is one of the most important infrastructures in the regional energy market, with a capacity of 1300 megawatts from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan providing a very good platform for the purchase and sale of energy in the region. By transferring electricity from Central Asia to South Asia via Afghanistan, the economic benefits of Central Asia and South Asia will be met in a mutually advantageous regional arrangement.

 

Last September, Turkmenistan completed an upgrade of its largest electric power plant, which it is hoped will help boost exports and eventually allow supplies to Pakistan. In 2018, Calik Holding signed a memorandum of understating with Turkmenistan and Pakistan to invest $1.6 billion over the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan transmission line. Afghanistan and Pakistan will receive 1000 megawatts of electricity annually from the project, thereby leaving Iranian energy firms in the dark.

 

What is on the Horizon?

 

Iran needs to redefine the role energy exports play in its foreign policy, especially in relation to its neighbors. Iran holds the potential to use active regional energy diplomacy to maintain a share in neighboring markets, provided it succeeds in reducing tensions and thus paving the way for advanced economic benefits.

 

Pakistan is investing in renewable and planning to increase this portion of its energy basket with the construction of a hybrid solar-wind energy system to bring energy to rural areas.

U.S. sanctions against Iran are clearly another factor that will drive Pakistan toward other energy partners. Iran may well lose Pakistan as an electricity importer, especially with the progress being made in electricity deals with Turkmenistan. If Iran intends to be present in the Pakistani energy market, it first ought to offer reasonable prices which can compete with Al-Anjali as well as Turkmen gas, as worked in the case of retaining Indian business.

 

If Iran can break the deadlock with the U.S., it may finally benefit from the financial capabilities and technology needed to produce more oil and gas to export to its neighbors. If the oil and gas pipeline projects which connect Iran to its neighbors function at their highest capacities, then the links forged through the deals which result could be a key to bringing peace and stability in the region — with the added bonus of making it much harder to impose effective sanctions on Iran after such links have been cemented.

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Challenges and Opportunities for Russia-Iranian Energy Relations in the Post Sanctions Era

Given several large Russian companies find themselves facing US sanctions they no longer face any further fall-out from working reliably in Iran. Indeed, Russian companies may continue their business in Iran’s oil, gas, and nuclear sectors unimpeded having already adapted to whatever curtailments have been inflicted upon them by US measures.

The purchase of Iranian oil by Russia is a significant aspect of the oil co-operation agreement struck between the two countries. At a meeting convened between Iran’s Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh and Russia’s Energy Minister, Alexander Novak in late December 2016, Iran agreed that a Russian company would sell Iranian oil, with 50% of profits handed to Russia in cash in Iran, and another 50% spent on purchasing goods and services from Russia to be put into operation in Iran.

Russia evidently desires a place in Iran’s oil industry. As the presidential aide, Yuri Ushakov recently stated, the country’s oil and gas companies are looking to invest in as much as a total of $50 billion to develop Iranian oil and gas fields. In his view, energy is the most promising area for cooperation between Russia and Iran; with leading Russian oil and gas companies such as Gazprom, Gazprom Oil, Rosneft, Zarubenzabad and Tatneft all having shown an active interest.

 

Russian firms’ withdrawal from Iran considering US withdrawal from JCPOA

 

Lukoil has joined others to halt activities in Iran since the departure of the US. The company had signed a mutually agreed partnership for the development of the Ab-Teymor oil field with Denmark’s Mersec, and the Indonesian Petrogas Vitamin Corporation.Regarding the company’s plans for the Iranian gas industry, the Deputy Chairman Gazprom, Alexander Medvedev, stated that “Gazprom is interested in cooperating with Iran from the beginning to the end of the gas value chain and plans to help in exploration, production, gas, LNG production, and gas supply through various pipelines, including those leading to India.”

After the nuclear agreement, Russia’s Zarubzhanov Corporation (with an 80% share), along with Dana Energy (with a 20% shareholding), signed a $742 million contract for the sustainable development of the West and Aban Oil Fields in Ilam province in partnership with the National Iranian Oil Company. The contract is set to stand for 10 years and can be renewed for up to 20. The combined production of these two fields is expected to increase by 67 million barrels over the next 10 years.

While Ali Akbar Velayati , an advisor to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, has said that Russian companies are ready to invest in the Iranian oil and gas industry by as much as $50 billion, one Kremlin spokesman has denied these statements, and the Russian Energy Minister has claimed that purchasing Iranian oil may have a negative consequence on Russian industries. At present, trade volume between Iran and Russia values just $2.2 billion, however, both countries hold a potential to increase their trade volume. Iran and Russia are both interested in increasing trade to $10 billion dollars in the short term. The question remains, none-the-less, as to whether Russia’s overtures in Iran amount to nothing short of investment.

Oil for food trade

During the last sanctions regime, both countries signed an agreement to sell Iranian oil to Russia in return for goods and technology. By importing 500 000 barrels of oil a day from Iran, Russian not only parted with no money, but were able to sell more of their goods to Iran. Also, since Iran’s oil is not compatible with oil refineries in Europe – or even most within Russia – this oil was most likely transferred from Russia to China, Iran’s largest oil market, other countries in the South or East Asia. In this way, Russia was thus able to expand its own oil relations.

Iran’s strategy of signing contracts for oil development with Russia is not unwise given the absence of any other serious player. Rouhani’s government has been weak in the development of oil fields over the past five years. It is true that his cause should be sought through foreign policy and an attempt to ease the pressure of the United States, but, in any case, its outcome has been detrimental. Russian companies have the technology needed to increase the recovery rate of Iranian oil reservoirs. The Oil Ministry is keen to allow oil companies in Europe, Russia, China, Asia, and even the Americas (Americans are currently barred) to get involved in the development of Iranian oil fields.

Oil exports are the result of production, minus domestic consumption, however, oil production in Iran is gradually decreasing as a result of the decline in the production of the reservoir. The drop in the production of Iranian oil reserves is currently around 8%. The biggest issue regarding Chinese and Russian investment in the Iranian energy industry after the lifting of sanctions would be the terms of the contracts concluded – namely, the duration of these contracts, and the amount of contracts and technology used in these oil and gas fields, not to mention conditions which increase the likelihood of companies to bow to US pressures To abandon Iranian projects.

Considering developments in the energy market more broadly, and the effect US sanctions will have upon it, attracting foreign investment and technology to the Iranian energy industry will be much harder to achieve. Achieving the goals of Iran’s sixth development plan and vision document is possible only through foreign investment, which requires a reduction of political risk in the country through a more engaging foreign policy and greater consideration of legal mechanisms to assure foreign investors.

For the foreseeable future, however, it looks as though talks will remain at the macro level until a deal has been signed. Although details of the $50 billion investment of Russian oil and gas companies in Iran have yet to be determined, this would provide a sigh of relief for the country’s industry. Many insist that such an investment would not equate to dependency on Russia. One expert has stated that “The Iranian oil and gas facilities and resources are so broad that even if $50 billion of capital is from companies Iran’s oil industry is not looking for a mere dependence on a country. The Russians will be brought to Iran; but there will be plenty of work remaining that will capture technology and foreign capital from other countries.

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Washington boosts LNG with Iran in sanctions crosshairs

The shale gas revolution has had a staggering effect on the world energy market, shifting many prior assumptions regarding the geopolitics of energy.
Whereas in 2000 and the first years of the new millennium, shale oil and gas accounted for just one percent of all fossil fuels produced in the United States, the country has now moved towards energy self-sufficiency and is taking on the role of an exporter.

Whereas the Obama administration was a major force in fostering this development as a means of freeing the country from foreign dependency through diversification, in tandem with increased green energy supplies, the Trump administration seems to have sought to focus on energy in a more traditional approach.

The shale gas revolution and consequent US energy boom finally meant that a static fact of world energy geopolitics, – ie: that the US was dependent on oil mainly imported from the Middle East – could be cast aside. The US is now energy self-sufficient and free to export Liquefied Natural Gas to neighbours and allies around the world, and thus has added to Washington’s political flexibility.

The uptick in gas production in the US has already decreased LNG prices in the EU and Asia and thus presents a challenge to the old energy order

Not surprisingly, this turn of events is being monitored closely by other energy exporters.

The US is already using its energy exports to reduce the EU’s dependency on Russian gas, while exerting pressure on its allies to see it as an alternative to Iranian natural gas.

The uptick in gas production in the US has already decreased LNG prices in the EU and Asia and thus presents a challenge to the old energy order. In terms of US national security then, the energy boom can be examined from two perspectives, first, its implications for US energy security and second, its implications for the wider field of international relations and its geopolitics.

 

US withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal 

Iran’s economy and energy sector has been devastated by the US and EU sanctions brought against it due to Iran’s former attempt to build a nuclear programme. Sanctions have not only scuppered Iran’s chances of success in achieving its energy goals but also have forced Iran to become more proactive in consolidating regional relations.

Since Washington’s departure from the JCPOA agreement, energy companies who had only just began to consider re-entering Iran have withdrawn in anticipation of further sanctions. Few international banks or financial institutes are willing to participate in energy projects in Iran under such conditions.
The US is interested in reducing Iran’s role in regional and global energy markets, with Washington often declaring a wish to bring Iranian oil production down to zero. It is a fact that American sanctions against Iran’s energy sector have vastly reduced the country’s production capacity. US sanctions have also wrought severe harm in terms of technology and finance.

The US plans to increase LNG exports to countries which depend on Iranian hydrocarbons in an attempt to wean these countries off their reliance. But some analysts believe the US oil and gas sector is unlikely to gain Iran’s share of the market, as technically, Iran’s export oil grades are heavier and sourer than the light, sweet crude exported from the US.

 

Following the US withdrawal from the treaty, the country further cut imports of oil from Iran. Japan now imports 5.5 percent of its oil from Iran, according to the Japanese Ministry of Economy and Trade. In August, Japan was receiving 17,775 barrels per day and bought 3.39 million barrels of crude in one month.

Japan called for an exemption from the US embargo on Iran, which was granted by the Trump administration – but only for six months. Part of Iran’s share of oil is expected to fall victim to an influx of LNG exports and US gas condensate onto Japan’s market. Sanctions against Iran’s energy industry have not only reduced Iran’s oil and gas production capacity, but also reduced Iran’s share of the global energy market. The rising lack of investment in the Iranian oil and gas industry is one particularly immediate result of renewed sanctions.

Reducing oil production capacity and, consequently, reducing Iran’s oil export potential will force Iran to find loans and facilities from banks and global financial institutions in order to develop its facilities – yet it is clear that new US sanctions will challenge Iran’s ability to retain much of its oil production capacity regardless.

Given the increase in natural gas producers and LNGs on the market, the US energy boom provides a good opportunity for Iran’s rivals – not least the US itself – from moving in on Iran’s share of the regional and global energy market.

The increase in US oil and shale gas production has made Iran more pressured to find new markets, yet the country does not have the capacity to produce LNG, thus competing with the US, and it is unclear when the capital and technology needed to complete its LNG project units will be provided.

The US superiority in terms of advanced technology, research, investment, and diplomatic reach ensure it will retain a high position in the world energy market, while Iran will likely flounder further. If Iran and the US agree on current political and security problems, Iran may gain the foreign capital and technology needed to recover some of its oil and gas production capacity.

Energy continues to play an important role in US foreign policy, with implications not only on relations with designated rivals but also allies across the world.

Energy exports play a key role in US relations with its neighbours and allies, and are a key tool in fostering and furthering relations with others. Energy exports as a means of expanding relations and helping US allies in South Asia and Europe are sure to lead to interesting geopolitical developments, and US LNG exports are most likely to be effective in reducing Iranian oil exports to Japan and South Korea.

Turkey and India


Turkey is a major purchaser of Iranian natural gas. Turkey has huge investments in LNG storage facilities and plans to increase its share of LNG in the domestic energy market. In 2015, Turkey began to import LNG from the US, and is now the second-largest importer of US LNG in Europe.

An increase in US and Qatari LNG – alongside new natural gas transit projects such as TANAP and the Turkish Stream – means that Iran may be largely sidelined by Turkey in the near future. Similarly, India has also signed a 20-year agreement to be supplied with US LNG, also ensuring a reduction of Iranian supplies to the Indian energy market over a similar period.

South Korea 

Seoul is one of the main customers of Iranian gas condensate. More than 55 percent of Iran’s gas condensate is exported to South Korea. According to official statistics from the Ministry of Oil, Iranian gas condensate exports in 2017 numbered 428,000 barrels per day on average.

Since the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, major Korean companies importing Iranian oil and gas condensate have cut imports from Iran. In the first six months of 2018, the Hanwa Total Petrochemical Company, the largest importer of Iranian gas condensate, imported 15.92 million barrels from Iran, but since August has reduced its imports to one-third, in favour of supplies from Qatar and the United States.


Japan

Japan is another main consumer of Iranian oil in East Asia. According to the Japanese Petroleum Association, in 2017 the country imported 172,216 bpd of oil from Iran, down 24.2 percent from the previous year. Iran’s oil accounted for 5.3 percent of total oil imports to Japan’s refineries in 2017.

Japan called for an exemption from the US embargo on Iran, which was granted by the Trump administration – but only for six months

Following the US withdrawal from the treaty, the country further cut imports of oil from Iran. Japan now imports 5.5 percent of its oil from Iran, according to the Japanese Ministry of Economy and Trade. In August, Japan was receiving 17,775 barrels per day and bought 3.39 million barrels of crude in one month.

Japan called for an exemption from the US embargo on Iran, which was granted by the Trump administration – but only for six months. Part of Iran’s share of oil is expected to fall victim to an influx of LNG exports and US gas condensate onto Japan’s market.

Sanctions against Iran’s energy industry have not only reduced Iran’s oil and gas production capacity, but also reduced Iran’s share of the global energy market. The rising lack of investment in the Iranian oil and gas industry is one particularly immediate result of renewed sanctions.

Reducing oil production capacity and, consequently, reducing Iran’s oil export potential will force Iran to find loans and facilities from banks and global financial institutions in order to develop its facilities – yet it is clear that new US sanctions will challenge Iran’s ability to retain much of its oil production capacity regardless.

Given the increase in natural gas producers and LNGs on the market, the US energy boom provides a good opportunity for Iran’s rivals – not least the US itself – from moving in on Iran’s share of the regional and global energy market.

The increase in US oil and shale gas production has made Iran more pressured to find new markets, yet the country does not have the capacity to produce LNG, thus competing with the US, and it is unclear when the capital and technology needed to complete its LNG project units will be provided.

The US superiority in terms of advanced technology, research, investment, and diplomatic reach ensure it will retain a high position in the world energy market, while Iran will likely flounder further. If Iran and the US agree on current political and security problems, Iran may gain the foreign capital and technology needed to recover some of its oil and gas production capacity.
Energy continues to play an important role in US foreign policy, with implications not only on relations with designated rivals but also allies across the world.

www.alaraby.co.uk/

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Tanker Insurance Cancellations threaten Iranian energy sector

The US’ withdrawal from the JCPOA and declaration of a new set of sanctions has been hard to swallow for those planning Iran’s energy sector, as they had been relying on the deal as a means of revivifying Iran’s oil and gas production capacity. These new sanctions are set to be implemented against Iran’s oil and gas sector on November 4. This is likely to have ahuge impact on Iran’s coffers, with insurers reportedly already halting coverage for shipments.

Following the announcement of a resumption of sanctions against Iran, owners of oil tankers were some of the first to start refusing trade with the country. When the previous round of sanctions against Iran was first established, tanker insurance was considered one of the main barriers to Iranian oil exports, as, given that most ship-owners carrying Iranian oil were not able to secure insurance, a number of Asian trading partners were forced to concede to government-sponsored security coverings.

When sanctions were imposed in 2012, the European Union prevented the International Group Corporation in London from providing any cover for Iran-bound cargo, which led to the de facto deployment of Iran’s tanker fleet, as foreign ships seeking to carry Iranian oil would henceforth be excluded from operating in the mainstream oil tanker market. This time, however, it remains unclear as to whether the EU will back US-led sanctions with such gusto.

Iranian companies have announced that they will continue to insure oil tankers, although this is somewhat difficult to do without connecting the Iranian banking system to international banks.

An Iranian supertanker called Happiness, which docked at a terminal operated by Iran’s national oil company on Kharg Island, for instance, currently has on board 2m barrels of oil. It was set to head for Asian markets at the beginning of September, although with Iran’s return to pariah status, its fate is now unclear. Iran’s own insurance companies are not recognized in international insurance circles. Additionally, these companies are facing their own domestic problems due to a lack of credit among financial and credit institutions in the country.

As one of Iran’s biggest export markets, firms and refineries in India in particularare very concerned about the insurance for tankers going between the two countries. Some refineries have already cut back on purchases of oil from Iran. Reuters reports that two major Indian refineries, Indian Petroleum and Bharat Petroleum, will reduce their purchases from Iran due to insurance concerns specifically. In response, Iran is planning to insure tankers transiting oil to India and to give special discount to Indian buyers.

Iran will not want to lose its share of the Indian energy market. According to Business India Online, The Indian government has allowed two Iranian insurance companies to pay a one-billion-dollar insurance coverage for Iranian oil tankers. This effort from New Delhi may have China, as the other largest consumer of Iranian oil, in mind. Custom from these major importers, however, are unlikely to mitigate the effects of US sanctions sufficiently by November if Iran is cut off from the global oil market.

EU buyers are also concerned about Tanker insurance. Coverage for the vast majority of ship leasing contracts is provided by IG Insurance Services Inc., if damage occurs, all actors in the tanker supply chain are aware that the group presides over billions of dollars in order to compensate. Even if both public and private insurance companies accept the risk of providing insurance for Iranian oil tankers, since no Iranian insurance company is a member of the International Syndicate of Oil Insurance, Iran’s insurance policy is essentially uncertifiable.

If Iran green lights such shipments regardless, it would be possible for Iranian tankers to be detained in international waters, leading to very severe legal consequences for Iran. The fact that both China and India have asked Iran to bear the cost of transporting and insuring their oil products shows that these Iranian oil customers want to put all liabilities on Iran as the seller.

To sum up, the hope of being able to by-pass tanker insurance with Iranian insurance is an overly optimistic move and may lead to an even greater conundrum of problems for Iran.

 

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Iran’s joint oil fields could resolve regional tensions

It is common for oil and gas fields to be joint-owned by two or more countries, which often presents various challenges. There is a particular fervour over the need to focus on extracting from such fields, with international energy companies often invited to vie for generous extraction contracts.Iran shares 26 oil and gas fields with its neighbours yet, due to a lack of technological and financial investment over the past years, Iran has been unable to extract a competitive amount of oil from such fields. This has led to their exploitation by Iran’s neighbours. Studies show that around 20 per cent of Iran’s recognised oil reserves and 30 per cent of its natural gas reserves are in joint fields.

 

So far, Iran has only been able to procure from ten of these 26 fields. Despite an increase in productivity in these fields – most notably in the South Pars, in the Persian Gulf – the Rouhani Administration has failed to acquire the capital and foreign technology needed to compete with, let alone acquire an edge over, neighbours in terms of procurements.

 

The majority of Iran’s joint oil fields are located on the Iraqi border – Iran shares at least five oil fields with Iraq. Iraq, for its part, has a seven-year plan to increase oil production capacity and reach 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd). Its focus has been on those fields it shares with Iran and, in 2010, the Iraqi government invited Iran to invest in joint fields with the aim of increasing production and developing an equal production capacity.

 

However, Iran was unable to invest more in these joint fields due to a lack of financial resources. During the period in which heavy sanctions were placed on the Iranian energy sector, Iraq produced 295,000 bpd from joint fields with Iran, yet Iran was able to produce a mere 130,000 bpd in the same period. Iraq also managed to sign agreements with major international oil companies to increase its share from joint fields with Iran. Iraq revised oil contracts and added new conditions in order to attract oil companies, offering increased benefits in return for technological know-how and investment. Iraq’s new contracts are more attractive for oil companies, while the fields themselves are geologically favourable for procurement. Iraq has a program to increase oil production from joint areas shared with Iran.

Iran has no production capacity in its fields in the Caspian Sea, where it has two oil fields shared with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Both countries plan to increase production from these fields and Iran will be not able to attract the foreign technology and capital needed to benefit due to US sanctions.

Qatar has also become a major exporter of liquefied natural gas, with a lot of investment in foreign technology and gas production focused on the South Pars. Given that the South Pars field has been Iran’s top priority, over the past five years Iran has at least succeeded in increasing procurement through investment here. In March 2017, Iran drew a competitive 250,000 bpd from the South Pars, with Qatar drawing 300,000 bpd over the same period.

Iran and Saudi Arabia share four oil and gas fields. By 2017, Iran’s oil production from the Forouzan oil field – also in the Persian Gulf – numbered between 38,000 to 40,000 bpd, while the Saudi side has far outstripped its rival with a production capacity of 400,000 bpd from this field. Similar imbalances are apparent in all shared fields in this area.

 

Joint oil and gas fields are important for all countries in the region, with all countries which share oil and gas fields with Iran gaining billions from their procurement. The US withdrawal from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, more commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal) has motivated many regional rivals to accelerate their activities further. Since major foreign oil firms have abandoned Iran in response to the now-ineffective agreement, these firms have similarly sought activities elsewhere in the region. Unconfirmed reports so far state that around $6 billion worth of gas has thus been lost to competitors. Any delay in the development of joint fields will thus cause irreparable losses for the country. Experts warn that any delay in signing contracts for foreign investment will hinder the development of joint fields and will help the neighbouring states to plunder Iranian oil reserves.

 

Cooperation between Iran and neighbouring Arab countries in the development of plans for joint fields could provide the basis for increasing security and stability in the region. Moreover, foreign investments are important for Iran in recovering its oil and gas production capacities. Iran’s huge oil and gas reserves can play a key role in the world energy market yet, as expected, with the withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear agreement the Iranian energy industry faces yet more challenges in attracting foreign investment and technology. After the removal of sanctions, Iran plans to create conditions for attracting foreign investors by drafting new oil contracts. Iran has repeatedly stated that it needs $2 billion of foreign investment to revive its oil and gas production capacity.

 

Considering developments in the energy market and US sanctions, attracting foreign investment and technology to the Iranian energy industry will be tougher than ever. Achieving the goals of the country’s Sixth Development Plan and Twenty-Year Development Plan is possible only with foreign investment, which requires a reduction of political risk in the country. In the event of a reversal of fortunes in terms of foreign policy and the provision of other requirements for foreign companies, capital can be expected to pour in – particularly from Russian and Chinese companies.

 

A change of attitude in foreign policy and an attempt to eliminate tensions with neighbouring countries will be an important step towards attracting foreign investors. An increase in the oil and gas production capacities of the country is a short and mid-term priority for Iran’s Oil Ministry. Yet Iran must resolve political tension with its neighbours and also negotiate with the West to if these goals are to become workable.

Iran’s joint oil fields could resolve regional tensions

 

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Driving Iranian oil export to zero in short term not easy: Energy expert

TEHRAN, Oct. 27 (MNA) –Touching upon the importance of oil market stability for the US, senior energy expert Omid Shokri says it is not easy to drive Iran’s oil export to zero in short term.

Following the brutal killing of Saudi Journalist at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, There have been lots of tensions between Saudi rulers and their western allies particularly the US.

The US President Donald Trump has had different contradictory and weak stances towards the scandal. Despite threatening serious punishments against killers of the Saudi journalist at the same time Trump calls the Saudi regime as an important ally for confronting Iran.

The issue was discussed with Omid Shokri Kalehsar, a senior senior energy security and policy analyst in Washington.

Referring to the significance of oil market stability he said, “Stability in world oil market is in favor of US. Any increase in oil market directly affect energy security in the US. US planning to drop Iran oil export to zero but in short term it will not be easy to drop Iran oil export. At long term with sufficient oil supply by major oil exporter Iran’s role in world oil market may decrease, Iran needs to keep its share in regional and world oil market. Iran needs to play active energy diplomacy if interested to keep and increase its share in regional and world oil market. It can be seen that Iran’s oil export will decrease more than %50 in contrast to post nuclear agreement.”

Asked about the possible effect of the recent tensions between Riyadh and Washington over the brutal murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Shokri said, “Current political tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, gives an opportunity to Saudi Arabia to export more oil to reduce Iran’s share in world market.

Current tension between US and Saudi Arabia, over Khashoggi hold a potential to affect world oil market but stability in oil market is US priority and also US trying to drop Iran oil export to zero. As mentioned before it will be hard to US to drop Iran oil export to zero. I think US and Saudi due to mutual interest are interested to manage any tension with aimed of decreasing Iran’s role in world oil market. Saudi has promised US to buy weapons from US and value of weapon agreements is above $100 billion. This agreement is very important for US economy and creation of job opportunities for US workers.”

Interview by Payman Yazdani

 

Mehrnews.com

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Iran’s Regional Electricity Hub Plan

Despite its huge oil and gas reserves, Iran has been unable to play an important role in regional and international energy market. The limitations placed on its industry, the high growth of annual domestic consumption, and the general disruptions caused to oil exports have all caused consternation among policymakers, especially in the absence of a broad, multi-tiered strategy. Iran needs to promote a smarter energy and foreign diplomacy if it wishes to increase regional cooperation and export electricity to generate the funds necessary to shift toward renewables. Any future sanctions against Iran’s energy sector would have little effect if the country increased the role of renewables in its energy basket. An improved investment climate and improved relations with neighbors would help Iran attract foreign capital and the technological know-how to achieve this goal.

 

Exporting electricity is better than exporting raw materials such as natural gas. At present, Iran produces a daily amount of 700-800,000 cubic meters. With the completion of five phases of the South Pars Field, the country could increase production by 150,000 cubic meters before March 2019. Its huge natural gas reserves allow Iran to use natural gas to generate electricity to export to neighbors.

 

According to 2018 statistics released by the Energy Ministry, Iran exported electricity to seven neighbors. In 2017, Iran ranked fourteenth among the world’s largest electricity suppliers, as well as constituting one of the countries with the lowest rates of accidents in the power sector. At present, Iran exports 12 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, while importing around 4 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually. This means earnings of anywhere between $900 million and $1 billion per year. Iran is interested in drawing up long-term contracts to increase elasticity with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, as according to Iranian officials, these countries are also interested in boosting electricity imports from Iran. For the first time in Iran’s history, the Iranian government has recently allowed foreign companies to export part of the electricity generated in the country to attract more foreign investments in renewables,

 

During the period of U.S. and EU sanctions against Iran’s energy sector, Iranian oil and gas production capacity dropped dramatically, causing decision makers to reconsider renewables in the future of the country’s energy basket. Presently, renewable energy represents less than 1 percent of electricity production, along with about 6 percent coming from hydroelectric. The government has insisted, at least on paper, that boosting renewables is a priority.

 

Hamid Chitchian, Iran’s former energy minister, has also declared that Iran’s energy diplomacy should focus on expanding electrical cooperation with neighbors. Post-sanctions Iran must apply changes to the configuration of its electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. According to the former minister, “Iran’s main priorities for the post-sanction era include use of modern technologies, plant efficiency, smart electrical grids, reopened credit lines, and foreign investment in the power industry.”

 

Although Iran’s exports of electricity in the region outweigh its imports, the country still hasn’t realized Article 60 of its Sixth Development Plan, which declares the country’s aim to become a regional electricity hub. Article 60 of the Sixth Plan for Economic Development demands steps be taken to establish a regional electricity market from the first year of the program. Iran’s geographical situation and electricity transit systems give it the perfect opportunity to connect to other markets in Russia via Azerbaijan, Europe via Turkey, and the MENA region through Iraq.

 

However, the active involvement of the private sector and the encouragement of foreign investors will be a pre-requisite for the construction of power plants and the development of electricity transmission networks.

 

From a political and security perspective, electricity exports, in contrast to conventional gas exports, could promote greater connectedness to the region and neighboring countries.

 

Currently, Iran has an electrical connection with all neighboring countries (except for Gulf states). In addition, the presence of expert and skilled human resources in Iran and high levels of self-reliance in the power industry and the construction of electrical equipment in the Middle East and Central Asian region are a relative advantage.

 

As part of the Paris agreement, Iran has voluntarily committed itself to installing the means for generating 7,500 megawatts of renewable energy by 2030. Iran has also passed new laws and regulations aiming to attract more foreign investment and technology in electricity generation.

 

A look at price changes applied to the country’s gas and electricity exports in recent years shows that the price of gas is more dependent on the price of oil than the price of electricity, and therefore revenues from electricity exports are more stable than gas-export earnings.

 

Iran can and should aim to become an energy hub for the region, as it is able to receive cheap electricity from Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and other countries to export to more wealthy buyers in Turkey, Iraq, the UAE, and Pakistan, which bid for electricity at a significantly better price. According to Iranian officials, Iran’s growing energy relations with neighbors have helped it to develop the infrastructure needed to expand its electricity export destinations and put it in a position to realize its goals. However, vast improvements are needed to the transport infrastructure and connectivity of countries of the region, as well as the development of maternal industries, such as the electricity industry and energy exports.

 

Still, after more than a decade, Iran has not put forward any specific operational plans for improving the conditions of the country to become the hub of the region. The failure to develop this infrastructure means that renewed sanctions against Iran’s energy sector will bring major challenges. All the foreign firms once active in Iran’s oil and gas fields, as well as any foreign energy companies that have signed agreement with Iran, left the country after the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement. Iran signed an agreement with Turkey’s Unit International to build a number of 5,000 megawatt power plants, but progress has stalled. Iran hopes that foreign capital and technology will produce more natural gas for electricity generation and greater export elasticity with neighbors mean that it may finally get back on its feet in the energy market. Iran must decrease domestic natural gas consumption and try to renew electricity infrastructure if it wishes for any chance of success in the regional electricity market. However, the main obstacle to this will undoubtedly by foreign policy and negotiating solutions with neighbors, not to mention the interlinked issue of attracting foreign investment.

 

https://lobelog.com/irans-regional-electricity-hub-plan/

 

 

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