Challenges Facing Natural Gas Export After the Sanctions

The share of Natural gas and LNG (Liquified Natural Gas) of the world energy market is increasing daily. In 2014, LNG’s share of the world gas market was 42% and according to International Energy Agency, this number will increase to 53% by the year 2040.

 

Among the LNG producing countries, Qatar has the highest share of exports. In 2016, of all the 264 million tons of LNG produced in the world, Qatar’s share was 77 million ton. Currently, countries such as Australia, Russia, United States, Mozambique… are investing heavily in this industry in order to increase their share of the market. As a result of the natural gas revolution in Chile and the new technologies and methods, the United States is quickly becoming one of the main LNG producers in the world, so much so that in near future, it will play an important part in the energy security of the European Union and East Asian countries. Since LNG export is more efficient than natural gas export, especially in long distance, we are now witnessing a new competition among the LNG producers over more shares in the market.

 

Despite having 18% of the world’s gas resources, Iran is unable to produce LNG. Iran has less than 1% of the world gas market and with the current patterns, its chances for increasing this share is slim. Before the US and EU sanctions over the nuclear program, Iran had made plans for LNG production. Three important projects of LNG, Persian, and Pars were left unfinished due to sanctions and foreign companies involved such as Shell, Repsol, Total, and Malaysia’s Petronas were forced to leave the county. “Iran LNG” project which is in 52% development, was designed for producing 10 million tons of LNG a year. After JCPOA, the regime wanted to finish this project with foreign investment and technology. The project required 4 billion dollars, but even before the United States’ decision to exit the deal, the negotiations with foreign companies were unsuccessful, and after US exit, it seems impossible to finish in such short time.

 

There were several plans designed for Iran to join the LNG exporter countries:

One of these plans was the Iran-Oman pipeline which was supposed to export 10 million square meters of natural gas a day. Iran wished to turn some of this gas into LNG in Oman facilities and then send it to market, but this deal has not come to fruition. The capacity of Oman’s facilities is about 1.5 to 2 million tons.

 

The other option was building small LNG units. After JCPOA, Iran had numerous negotiations with Russian, Chinese, and Korean companies for building small LNG units. The production capacity of these small units is 300 tons a day, and they are usually used for delivering gas to distant areas that might be difficult to reach. Iran was planning to build several of these LNG units over two years, but the sanctions and lack of interest from foreign companies prevented it.

 

Iran’s next option was using offshore LNG producing ships. Floating LNG (FLNG) is a type of ship with LNG production technology that mines a gas field under the sea and turns it into LNG. In the fall of 2017, there were negotiations between Iran and a Norwegian company to buy floaters, but that also failed.

 

Saturation of the LNG market and the competition among the producing countries will make it more difficult for the new producers of LNG to enter the market. Iran’s vast resources of natural gas is a good opportunity for the country to play a role in the regional and international market by producing LNG. Exporting LNG to distant countries through pipelines is not efficient. The safest alternative is for Iran to consider east Asia, India, and the European Union for LNG export in the long run. But without any changes to its regional policies, the Islamic Republic will have a hard time attracting foreign investments. The main obstacle to drawing investments in the energy industry, especially in natural gas and LNG, is the lack of a legal structure for effective and quick decision making and the country’s political instability. These are not difficult to overcome if there is a political will to use natural gas in order to improve the economic and political conditions of the country.

 

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Turkey to Continue Iran Gas Exports Despite US Sanctions

TEHRAN, Sep. 16 (MNA) – Omid Shokri Kalehsar, a senior energy security analyst, told Mehr News that Turkey will continue to import natural gas from Iran despite US’ sanctions targeting Iran’s oil sector.

Omid Shokri Kalehsar, a senior energy security analyst and PhD candidate in international relations, said in an exclusive interview with Mehr News Agency that Turkey is keen on buying natural gas from Iran with “reasonable price” in contrast to the price it pays for the gas imported from Russia and Azerbaijan.

He stressed that if Iran and Turkey can agree on a price and Iran is able to produce more natural gas, Turkey will be interested to consider buying gas from Iran instead of the other two rivals.

He went on to add, however, that while Turkey’s private companies have enough financial resources to attract Iran’s market, a legal framework, an efficient decision-making process, and political stability are also needed to make attracting foreign investment possible.

The following is the text of his interview with Mehr News:

Back in 2015, Iran had voiced willingness to pipe its natural gas to Europe through Turkey. Did that plan ever come to anything? And is the project still feasible after the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the reinstatement of economic sanctions on Tehran?

Iranian officials many times showed their interest to export natural gas to EU and play a role in EU energy security. Iran holds world’s second natural gas reserve but at present has no major natural gas export. It should be noted that Iran has high domestic natural gas consumption and suffers lack of foreign investment and technology and capital capacities due to sanctions. Iran just exports annually 10 bcm to Turkey. Major natural gas export needs more foreign investment, financial resources and decrease in domestic consumption.

In coming years there is no more demand in EU natural gas  market. At present EU members states’ LNG imports from US and Russia plays a key role in EU natural gas market and is planning to export more natural gas to EU via new pipeline projects such as Turk Stream and Nord Stream 2. EU members also made more investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency.

Iran needs about 4-6$ billion to construct required infrastructure to deliver natural gas to Turkey borders. And at present Iran has no more capital capacities. And current natural gas price is not economical for Iran to export natural gas to EU via pipeline.

Ankara has pledged to boost imports of Iranian gas despite US sanctions. Is that request still on the table?

US sanctions targeted Iran oil sector and Turkey will continue natural gas import from Iran. Turkey has some domestic pipelines project and at present natural gas system is not integrated, Turkey needs Iran natural gas to use it in Southern part of Turkey which has cold winters. Ankara is interested in importing more natural gas from Iran. Turkey begins to import natural gas from Azerbaijan via TANAP project and by next year Turkey will import natural gas from Russia through Turk Stream project. By 2026 and at the end of Iran-Turkey natural gas agreement, Turkey is interested in importing more natural gas from Iran and extend the natural gas agreement with Iran. Turkey’s officials have repeatedly stated that they want to buy natural gas from Iran with reasonable price in contrast to the gas price which Turkey imports from Russia and Azerbaijan. If Iran and Turkey agree on price and Iran is able to produce more natural gas, Turkey will import more natural gas from Iran. It should be noted that more natural gas production needs more investment in oil and gas fields and requires infrastructure and giving priority to energy efficiency in Iran. Turkey told US officials that it will continue importing oil and gas from Iran but during last month Turkey decreased oil import from Iran.

Turkey has stressed that it does not approve of US sanctions against Iran, calling them ‘unilateral’. Meanwhile, Turkish energy company Unit International has a strong presence in Iran, with a $4.2 billion worth of contract with Iran’s energy ministry to build seven natural gas power plants here. How much progress has the company achieved with the project so far? Has Unit International decided to remain in Iran or abandon its investment projects under US pressure?

Post-JCPOA Iran expected to have more foreign investment in its energy sector.  Unit International was one of the foreign firms which signed an agreement with Iran to build seven natural gas power plants. According the agreement, Iran will provide the natural gas which Unit International need for these power plants. Iran has also pledged to guarantee purchase generated electricity from these power plants at a predetermined agreed price over a period of 6 years.

By September 2018, there was no major development in this agreement. There were challenges and debates between government and parliament over this agreement.  Asadollah Gharakhani, spokesman of Iranian Parliament Commission on Energy announced that in attraction of foreign investors for energy sector, government policy should include transferring of knowledge and technology, and also human resource training. He refers to the fact that Unit International has no history of construction of power plants and this company was not considered a power plant manufacturer, he claims that Unit International in Turkey occasionally organizes hotels and business activities.

US withdrawal from JCPOA is a major problem for any foreign company interested in investing in Iran energy sector. It is expected that Unit International needs Turkish government’s strong support to keep investing in Iran and to continue construction of natural gas power plants. I think it will not be easy for Unit International to maintain in Iran. The other problem in both Iran government and parliament is the support to this company and other foreign firms to be more active in Iran energy sector. Turkey’s private companies have good experience and enough financial resources to attract the Iran market. The problem is that to attract foreign investment you need a legal framework, an efficient and fast decision process and political stability (especially in the international context). At the moment these variables are far from being achieved.

Omid Shokri Kalehsar is a senior energy security analyst and PhD candidate in International Relations. His primary research interest is in the area of energy diplomacy, geopolitics of energy, Iran–Russia relations and Iran-Turkey relations.

Interview by: Payman Yazdani, Marjohn Sheikhi

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The fate of Iran’s energy development plans under US pressure

Tehran, Iran, November 18

By Mehdi Sepahvand – Trend:

A recent expression of doubt by Patrick Pouyanné, the chief executive officer of France’s energy giant Total, whether to carry out cooperation with Iran has strengthened worries over the fate of Iran’s energy development projects.

 

Omid Shokri, a Washington-based energy analyst, told Trend November 18 that “Total or any other oil and gas company is interested to have good relations with US,” adding, it is possible for Total to withdraw from South Pars field.

 

Total’s chief executive officer last week said under political pressure, his company is liable to leave the $4.8 billion deal with Iran. “If we cannot do that for legal reasons, because of [a] change of [the] regime of sanctions, then we have to revisit it,” he said.

 

Total last week increased its US presence with the purchase of a portfolio of liquefied natural gas assets from Engie (ENGIY), including the company’s stake in the Cameron LNG project in Louisiana, one of the first new gas export terminals in North America.

 

Sealed a few months ago, the deal with Total over the development of South Pars gas field used to be vied by Iran as an icebreaker and itself a discouragement for new sanctions on Iran.

However, last month US President Donald Trump unveiled a tough and comprehensive new policy towards Iran. He accused Tehran of violating the 2015 nuclear accord (which had paved the way for removal of sanctions) and announced that he would no longer certify that the lifting of sanctions was in US interests.

 

Shokri believes that major to-be partners of Iran’s oil and gas companies are waiting for US Congress decision about Iran and nuclear agreement.

 

This is while Iran used to cherish the nuclear deal as a means to open way for the development of its oil and gas industries, which had been kept outdated by years-long sanctions.

Iran’s economy is heavily oil-dependent. In the early 2010s, sanctions efficiently stifled the country’s oil revenues as its exports dropped from 2.3 mbpd to 1 mbpd.

 

Iran’s oil, gas, and petrochemical infrastructure are not by far as efficient as they could. Many of the country’s oil fields are in the second half of their lives and need restoration or else they lose profitability.

https://en.trend.az/business/economy/2823946.html

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What connects Turkey and Iran? – A look from Washington – EXCLUSIVE

Omid Shokri Kaleshar

Senior Energy Security Analyst, Washington, specifically for Eurasia Diary

Yesterday Turkish President Recep Erdogan negotiated on the regional crisis with the Iranian President Hassan Ruhani and, in particular, a referendum on Syria and Iraq with Iranian officials. Turkey suffered more from the Syrian crisis and presented about 3 million Syrian refugees living there. By October 2017, Turkey donated about $ 30 million to Syrian refugees. Iran and Turkey together with Russia have the potential to solve the Syrian problem, but they also need to cooperate with the US on this issue.

The Iranian and Iraqi forces conducted trainings near the border with the autonomous region of Kurdistan in Iraq, especially after tension raised after the referendum on independence. Last week, the head of the Turkish military headquarters, General Hulusi Akar, visited Tehran for talks with the leading military and political figures of Iran, who are expected to deal with border security and the fight against terrorism, along with regional problems.

 

Turkey and Iran agreed to strengthen military ties after referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan, where more than 90% of population voted for independence. Iran with Iraq and Turkey can expand military cooperation and conduct military exercises near the borders of Iraq in order to effectively counter regional instability.

There is a Kurdish minority lives in both of countries and they want to create a Kurdish state that directly affects national security, and it is expected that they will apply the same policy in this matter. Energy-intensive Turkey imports large volumes of natural gas from Iran. Both countries are seeking to enhance banking and trade ties in order to triple bilateral trade to $ 30 billion a year in the coming years after the lifting of international sanctions against Tehran.

The preferential trade agreement between Turkey and Iran turned out to be a huge disappointment during the first two years, when bilateral trade lagged behind the $ 35 billion target that the deal was supposed to reach. The agreement, which entered into force on January 1, 2015, aimed at reducing tariffs for about 300 products in order to triple the volume of trade. The results, however, were far from ideal, not even reaching one-third of the goal. While the Iranian market caused the appetite of the world’s trading giants, Turkey showed itself in a very favorable position, being the closest neighbor with already existing tariffs. Nevertheless, there were many disappointments. Despite the lifting of sanctions, Turkish-Iranian trade in 2016 was 100 million fewer than in the previous year, which meant the collapse of the preferential trade deal in just two years.

 

Starting from the first year, the deal resulted in an unexpected result: instead of growth, the volume of trade between the two neighbors declined. Turkish-Iranian trade amounted to 9.76 billion dollars at the end of 2015 dollars. Not only at 25 billion dollars smaller than the target, but also by $ 4 billion below the level of 2014 in the amount of 13.7 billion dollars. In 2016, Turkey’s exports to Iran amounted to 4.97 billion dollars. compared with 3.66 billion dollars. in the previous year, while imports from Iran, including natural gas, amounted to 4.7 billion dollars., compared with 6.1 billion dollars. in 2015.

Turkey had a positive balance of trade with Iran for the first time in 16 years. Even if this is a small surplus (only about $ 270 million), the fact that the balance is changing in favor of Turkey is a noteworthy development, the result of a steady trend over the past four years. Considering the instability in Iraq and the referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan, Iran has the potential to supply oil and gas to Turkey.

Iran and Turkey should prepare a joint plan, which take into account their national interests regard to the regional crisis, especially in Iraq and Syria. Instability in the region does not benefit the regional states, and it should be noted that both countries are neighbors. The regional crisis requires regional cooperation, and also with the main actors in the region, no country in itself has the capacity to address the regional crisis.

In summary, Iran and Turkey have their own interests in the region, and in some circumstances there is a clash of interests, but by 2017, after the Syrian crisis and after the referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan, both countries, cooperating with Iraq on the issue of Iraqi Kurdistan, and with Russia, and with the United States in the Syrian crisis, should play a more active role. Instability and chaos in these regions directly affect the stability and security of Iran and Turkey. Regional cooperation and large entities in the region are needed to solve the regional crisis.

http://ednews.net/en/news/interview/196428-what-connects-turkey-and-iran

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U.S. Sanctions Threaten India’s Importation of Iranian Oil

Washington has said that to achieve significant reductions in Iranian oil exports it needs India to observe the sanctions.

 

by Rauf Mammadov Follow @RaufNMammadov and   Omid Shokri Kalehsar Follow @ushukrik

When the United States pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal in May, it told countries trading with Iran that they would have to stop soon or face American sanctions.

As the first ninety-day wind-down period for ceasing trading with Iran comes to an end, Washington is ratcheting up the pressure on the main importers of Iranian crude oil.

However, most of the other countries that signed the nuclear deal —including many in Europe—continue to support it. But companies, not governments, import oil—and they are likely to buckle under the U.S. pressure.

A key exception is Chinese companies, which collectively amount to the world’s largest buyer of Iranian oil. They remain defiant against the U.S. sanctions threat, a stance which their government obviously supports. The defiance comes as tension with America already increasing due to a trade war that Washington started.

 

The European Union is also embroiled in a trade war with the United States. This is increasing the pressure on European companies to comply with Washington’s no-trade-with-Iran order. Most have said they will comply with it.

Another important player in the Iran sanctions game is India. In fact, the United States has said that to achieve significant reductions in Iranian oil exports it needs India to observe the sanctions.

Iran’s geographical proximity to India, coupled with India’s growing demand for petroleum, made an oil trading partnership between the two almost inevitable.

In 2017, India imported almost 40 percent of its oil from Iran, making it the second-largest importer of Iranian crude, behind China. India bought $13 billion worth of petroleum products from Iran that year, with crude accounting for the vast majority

The energy cooperation between Tehran and Delhi has not been limited to oil and gas trading, however.

After the Iran nuclear deal was signed in the summer of 2015, India began making major investments in Iran’s oil industry, including building petrochemical and fertilizer plants.

India has also wanted to invest in the Farzad B gas field. An Indian consortium led by the state-owned Oil and Gas Corporation discovered the field in 2012, and it began producing in 2013. A dispute over the terms of India’s participation in the field’s production has prevented a deal from being reached, however.

Meanwhile, Iran’s plan to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India has been stalled due to disagreements over the terms of the deal.

Furthermore, after Iranian President Hassan Rouhani visited India in February, the countries expressed optimism that their trade would double.

Two events undermined that optimism, however. One was the United States increasing its threats to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal —which it ended up making good on in May. The other was Saudi Arabia, Iran’s main political rival in the Middle East, stepping up its energy diplomacy toward India.

In April, Saudi Aramco signed a deal with a consortium of Indian companies led by the state-owned Indian Oil Corporation to take a 50 percent stake in a $44 billion mega-refinery and petrochemicals complex that will be built in the port city of Ratnagiri. The Saudis calculated that helping India create one of the world’s largest refining and petrochemical complexes would not only help tilt it away from Iran but also guarantee long-term Saudi crude sales to India

Meanwhile, the United States has been increasing its diplomacy toward India, with the key goal of persuading India to embrace sanctions against Iran.

 

In addition, America’s ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, who is of Indian descent, visited New Delhi last month to ask that India reduce its Iranian oil imports.

 

A U.S. Treasury Department delegation followed. It was led by Marshall Billingslea, the department’s assistant secretary for anti-terrorism financing. Given Billingslea’s background, one topic was likely to be a scheme that Iran and India used to avoid previous U.S. sanctions against Iran.

The two visits are already yielding results for Washington.

 

Indian refineries have begun canceling oil import contracts with Iran. Hindustan Petroleum, which owns India’s third-largest refinery, canceled an Iranian oil shipment in July when its insurance company refused to cover the sale because of impending U.S. sanctions.

In addition, news surfaced that Indian conglomerate Reliance Industries , which owns the largest refining complex in the world, also planned to halt Iranian oil imports.

Fearing aggressive Trump administration policies towards Iran, India is also expected to scrap the rupee-based trade agreement it concluded with Iran three years ago, Iranian sources say.

India had used the rupee-rial arrangement to buy Iranian oil before U.S. sanctions were lifted against Iran in 2016. The two sides used Turkey’s Halk Bank as an intermediary in their trading.

 

In May, a federal judge in New York sentenced a top Halk Bank executive to three years in prison for designing and carrying out the scheme. U.S. prosecutors had contended that the deal was used to evade U.S. sanctions against Iran that the Obama administration imposed before the nuclear deal.

Before he became assistant Treasury secretary for anti-terrorism financing, Billingslea was managing director of business intelligence services for Deloitte, where he focused on illicit finance. In the wake of the prison sentence against the Halk Bank executive for the rupee-rial scheme, it was significant that after Billingslea left India, his next destination was Turkey .

 

India did obtain one sanctions-related victory from the United States, however. Washington agreed to allow it to invest in the expansion of Iran’s port of Chabahar if it complies with U.S. import sanctions against Iran.

Chabahar is key to an Indian policy of offsetting Pakistan’s and China’s use of Pakistan’s port of Gwadar to project more power in the region. China has made renovation and expansion of the port of Gwadar an integral part of its $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project. The project includes a naval base.

Chabahar is only 107 miles from Gwadar. Iran has asked India to help it build steel and petrochemical plants in the port to boost its economy and increase development along the Makrān coast. It also plans to create a free trade zone in the port to try to spur economic growth.

 

With so many countries trying to flex their muscle in the region —the United States, Saudi Arabia, Iran, China and Pakistan—India is likely to find it harder to strike a balance between competing interests in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

It will continue to accommodate Iran by supporting the nuclear deal and by participating in mutually beneficial projects such as the expansion of the port of Chabahar.

But it will be increasingly difficult and dangerous for Indian refining and petrochemical companies to find wiggle room that allows them to avoid U.S. sanctions, as they once did.

Rauf Mammadov is a resident scholar at Middle East Institute and Senior Advi

sor at Gulf State Analytics.

Omid Shokri Kalehsar is a Washington-based senior energy security analyst, and Ph.D. Candidate in International Relations at Yalova University, Turkey.

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/us-sanctions-threaten-indias-importation-iranian-oil-28252?page=0%2C1

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Identifying and Explaining Geopolitical Opportunities of Energy (Oil and Gas) as part of a Long-Term Strategy for Iran and Russia

Lifting sanctions in the wake of the Iranian nuclear deal opened large opportunities for resource-rich Iran to bring its long-stagnant industry up to date. Most of the oil fields in Iran are in the second half of their production capabilities, with the productivity of wells decreasing by 8% annually. The result has been a decline in foreign exchange earnings and the gradual loss of Iran’s share in the oil market. According to Iranian officials, Iran needs around $100 billion foreign investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors” to increase its oil efficiency.

 

A major Russian investment in Iran’s energy sector came in the form of Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant. Russia has been active in Iranian nuclear power since mid-1990 and has continued cooperation with the country’s nuclear plan despite opposition from the West. Rosatom completed the Bushher Power Plant with some delay, and some analysts believe the cost of completing this power plant was higher than could have been achieved through other companies. Iran and Russia also signed agreements for the construction of a further nuclear power plant. Electricity generated in the Busher Power plant supply just about 2% of Iran’s electricity demands. Nuclear cooperation is thus more so in Russia’s favor.

 

In 2017, Iran and Russia signed an oil-for-food deal with Iran to be will be implemented next month with the purchase of 100 000 barrels of oil a day from Iran. The first oil for food agreement was signed in 2014, in the midst of EU and US sanctions. In Januray  2014, Iran and Russia an oil-for-goods swap worth $1.5 billion per month that would enable Iran to lift oil exports substantially, undermining Western sanctions. Such agreements could come back on the agenda with the likely return of new US sanctions, and causing Russia to once again play a role in the Iranian energy sector.

 

By 2015, Russian firms such as Luk Oil and Gazprom began showing interest in investing in Iran’s energy sector.  On March 2015, Russia’s Zarubezhneft signed agreements with the Iranian Oil Ministry to boost production at two oil fields in the country’s west. Zarubezhneft and Dana Energy, will develop the Aban and Paydar fields in Ilam province near the Iraqi border jointly with a private Iranian company, to boost production from 36 000 to 48 000 barrels of oil per day. The Russian company Zarupozhgft’s share of this contract is 80%, and the share of the National Iranian Oil Company is 20%. The cost of increasing the production efficiency of Aban and Sustainable West oil fields is estimated at $675 million. In addition, $68 million is also expected to cover indirect costs for the project. Part of this money will be spent on the repair of pumps and replacement of worn pumps.

 

After US withdraw nuclear deal major foreign companies withdraw from Iran energy sector. Luk oil official said that they no more consider invest in Iran oil and gas fields. It should be noted that in during past years and last round of US and EU sanctions, Russia had no major investments in Iran’s upstream industry. Russia prefers to invest in oil and gas fields which will pose no threat to its own oil and gas market. Both countries are trying to use their vast hydrocarbon reserves as a political tool to get more gain in their relations with rest of the world. Thus, despite its diplomatic and economic cooperation with Iran, Russia is in favor of any sanctions which decrease Iran’s oil and gas production capacity.

 

Limiting the production capacities of Iranian oil and gas is in favor of Russia and other major oil producers. At present, Iran only exports natural gas to Turkey and has no major plans to export more natural gas for other countries. In terms of natural gas and LNG, Iran is far from posing a threat to the Russian market, but in oil Iran still has potential. US new sanctions aimed at decreasing Iran’s oil exports give an opportunity to Russia to fill the vacuum and take Iran’s would-be share in the regional and global market, especially in Asia and the EU.

 

Russia’s investments in Iran have led to closer coordination in foreign policy, not least with regards to Syria. Last year, and in mid-2018 ,Russian official many times declared their interest in investing  about  50 b$ in Iran’s energy sector. In the first week of July, the Senior Advisor to the Leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolution in International Affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati visited Russia, and after negotiations with Russian officials said that Russia was ready to invest  50 b$ in Iran’s energy sector. The discussion focused on Russo-Iranian cooperation on issues in the region, including developments in Syria. The parties reaffirmed their commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s Nuclear Deal (JCPOA), Iran-Russia energy relations after US withdrawal from the JPCOA, thereby utilizing the situation to further bilateral relation with an obvious increase in Russian influence on Iran. In an alternative scenario, Iran could provide an alternative to Russian gas for the EU in the long term.

 

On 23 July , Iranian Oil Minister Bizhan Zanghaneh attended the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in Moscow, meeting with Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak. They discussed bilateral relation, particularly in the field of energy. Last March, Russia and Iran signed a string of cooperation agreements in various fields, including energy. Details of the outcome of these meetings have still not been distributed to the press.

 

The actual question is whether despite the US opting out of the nuclear agreement, whether Russian investments in the country’s natural gas and oil fields will have an impact? This rests on whether the investments will go towards developing infrastructure and technological capacities. If this is the case, then which countries will benefit from purchasing renewed output? How will this renewal impact Iran’s regional relations? Will Russia eye this development closely? The coming months will reveal much on this front.

https://uwidata.com/

 

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