Iranian-Omani Gas Pipeline: A Link for Iran to the World?

To meet its growing energy needs, Oman is looking to increase its natural gas supply above the current levels of imports brought in from Qatar via the Dolphin pipeline. While Oman also exports significant volumes of natural gas from its liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities, it has had to devote significant amounts of its own production to domestic demand. What are the prospects for Iranian natural gas to reach Oman and global markets through the anticipated Iranian-Omani gas pipeline project?

 

Iran, which has the second largest natural gas reserves in the world, has plans to increase its exports of natural gas to other countries. At present, despite this major advantage, the country presides over a share of less than 1 percent of the world’s natural gas market. Nevertheless exporting natural gas to its neighbors is one of Iran’s priorities for the future. Iran’s export of oil and gas to its neighbors would help the region’s states resolve their problems and would promote peace and stability in the region. The Iranian-Omani natural gas pipeline would provide Iran a significant opportunity to export gas to Oman, as well as to other countries.

Iranian-Omani Natural Gas Pipeline

Natural gas consumption in the Sultanate of Oman more than doubled in the decade leading up to 2016.

Natural gas consumption in the Sultanate of Oman more than doubled in the decade leading up to 2016. Recognizing Oman’s increasing demand, in 2013, Iran and Oman signed a memorandum of understanding to build a new pipeline to export Iranian natural gas directly through the Gulf to Oman. The $25 billion agreement promised gas supplies to Oman via the construction of a subsea pipeline. While the pipeline construction was subsequently halted, the project now has a new deadline for its hoped-for completion by 2020.

The ultimate anticipated capacity of this new pipeline, called the Iranian-Omani pipeline, is 1.5 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of gas to be pumped into Oman every day. The Iranian-Omani pipeline would deliver some of the gas for processing at the Al-Anjui processing plant to send on to target markets in Oman, while the remaining pipeline capacity would be allocated to future markets in the Gulf.

A portion of the gas to be transported through the pipeline is anticipated to be converted into LNG to be shipped to target markets in East Asia and Europe. The remaining pipeline capacity will be allocated to future markets in the Gulf states. The project, long anticipated, was initially estimated at a cost of $1.2 billion, with initial volumes of 30 million cubic feet (MMcf) per day of natural gas to be transported from Iran’s Kuh Mobarak port to Oman’s port of Sohar.

Iran’s oil minister has stated that the country hopes to export Iranian natural gas to other countries of the region, especially Asian countries, through Oman. After the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”) nuclear agreement was reached in 2015, Iran invited foreign energy firms to invest in Iran’s energy projects, and especially the Iranian-Omani pipeline. In 2017, Iran officially invited Russia to build a gas pipeline to Oman. Ali Karder, the Deputy Oil Minister and CEO of the National Iranian Oil Company, invited Gazprom to lead construction efforts.

In September 2018, Bijan Zanganeh, the oil minister of Iran, met with his Omani counterpart. The result was an agreement to build a natural gas pipeline with a capacity of 1 Bcf per day—equivalent to 28 million cubic meters per day, or 10 billion cubic meters annually from Iran. The monetary value to Iran of this volume would range from around $1.5 million to $2 million.

Due to the United Arab Emirate (UAE)’s opposition to the pipeline crossing through its shallows, the pipeline is now expected to traverse the deeper waters of the Oman Sea, which will increase the cost and time frame for construction. Technology for the construction and installation of a pipeline is also problematic. Iranian companies are not experienced in installing pipeline in waters deeper than 1000 meters, thus making the involvement of an international partner essential for the project’s success.

Initial talks on a joint gas project with Iran were launched in 2004, but because Iran’s gas balance was not positive and consumption outweighed production at the time, negotiations then were hypothetical, at best. But with the arrival of the eleventh government and new phases of the South Pars Fields boosting Iran’s natural gas production, exports to other countries were put back on the agenda, with 92 rounds of rigorous negotiations ending in the signing of a final agreement.

Effect of Sanctions

In first months of 2018, with the benefits of the JCPOA nuclear agreement still formally in place, a joint work plan for the sale of gas to Oman from the Kish Gas Field was signed at the joint meeting of the Iranian oil industry with various ministers from Oman. The volume of the Kish field reserves is estimated at around 48 trillion cubic feet of gas.

Renewed U.S. sanctions against the Iranian energy sector will affect energy projects such as the Iranian-Omani pipeline, and bring along other practical challenges. Oman is banking on U.S. sanctions only applying to Iran’s oil exports and not to exports of natural gas. Oman’s Oil Minister, Mohammed Al-Ramhi, has stated that the country will continue to import gas from Iran, despite sanctions from the U.S. and that the pipeline project will go ahead.

Natural gas is stored in Oman either to fill reserves or to be sent off to target markets. As Oman has sought to diversify its economic prospects in the last few years, following a decline in its natural gas production and a shortage of gas, as well as other economic shortfalls, the proposed pipeline with Iran is part of this strategy.

Iran is expected to add a substantial amount of pipeline infrastructure across the Middle East in the coming years by building 12,698 kilometers (km) of planned pipelines by 2022.

Iran is expected to add a substantial amount of pipeline infrastructure across the Middle East in the coming years by building 12,698 kilometers (km) of planned pipelines by 2022. According to Global, the distance of the route planned for the Iranian-Omani pipeline is 50 percent of Iran’s overall projected pipeline. Second to Iran comes Iraq in terms of planned pipelines, which plans to invest $29.6 billion by 2022 by adding 5,105 km of oil and gas pipelines. Turkey comes in third place with a planned 2,030 km of pipeline at a cost of around $5.8 billion.

Iran needs to diversify its exports to the same degree that Oman needs natural gas imports to offset its energy shortages. As of 2014, Oman imported about 73 Bcf of natural gas from Qatar through the Dolphin pipeline, which runs from Qatar to Oman via the UAE, but it planned to phase out such imports when Phase 1 of the Khazzan tight gas field in Oman, operated by BP, commenced production in 2017. The Khazzan field commenced operations in Q4 2017, but it is still too early to tell how it will impact Oman’s imports in the longer term.

What Does the Future Hold?

While Oman’s economic development is based on energy-dependency, there are also political and geopolitical considerations at play. The gas pipeline between Iran and Oman is the bridge between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Because it most certainly will not be limited only to exporting Iranian gas to Oman, Iran will likely export gas to other countries via Oman as an intermediary. If this strategy succeeds, then another line may be built parallel to this pipeline in the long-term.

Trouble may be in store from the GCC countries, naturally suspicious of Iranian products entering their market. On the other hand, Oman has always pursued an independent policy, despite its membership in the Council. Its pipeline construction policy undoubtedly will follow that tradition. By creating a possible opportunity for dialogue between Iran and the United States, Oman may even benefit politically from the move. Oman has always pursued a policy of tolerance and peaceful coexistence with the countries of the region and resolving issues through dialogue and mediation. Although it faces pressure and problems from its neighboring countries, its policy has continued steadfast despite opposition.

In 2017, a number of meetings were convened in which Indian, Iranian, and Omani officials discussed Iranian gas being transported to India via the Iran-Oman pipeline in order to offset the impact of U.S. sanctions and to allow Iran access to one of its key consumers. As of the end of 2018, however, there has been no major progress on the Iranian-Omani pipeline, and thus any talk of further exports to India via the project is at present just a pipe dream.

Although the technology to manufacture and install pipelines in a shallow sea bed is available to Iranian companies, Iran would certainly jump at the chance to use international technology and financial capital to complete the Iranian-Omani pipeline given its inexperience with projects deeper than 1000 meters. LNG exports comprise one of Iran’s main plans to export natural gas to the European Union (EU) market.  

The Iranian-Omani pipeline project would be an ingenious way to realize this goal. Iran requires further financial capital and technology, however, to build the required infrastructure to export natural gas to the EU and to Iran’s other future target energy markets. However, given the sanctions, no major foreign energy firms are likely to provide the financial or other support needed in the short-term.

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Iranian-Indian Energy Relations Under Sanctions

Since it has huge oil and gas reserves and is geographically quite close, Iran is ideally placed to provide energy to India, and thus the country is Iran’s second largest oil market after China. Even at the height of the U.S. sanctions on Iran’s energy sector, India continued to import oil from the country. The relationship between Iran and India has expanded rapidly in recent years. After the 2015 nuclear deal, with the lifting of sanctions in various fields, especially energy, economic and commercial links between Iran and India expanded dramatically.

With new sanctions on the horizon, Iran provided significant discounts to Indian importers last summer. Thus, the volume of August imports was 56 percent higher than the previous August. So far, India is one of the countries exempted from secondary sanctions that the Trump administration is imposing on states doing business with Iran. But oil prices are expected to rise nevertheless, which will adversely affect India as the third largest oil importer in the world.

Although sanctions on banking prevented New Delhi from transferring money from the sale of oil to Iran in time, links were preserved thanks to strategies established during the previous round of sanctions. At that time, 55 percent of the proceeds from the sale of Iranian oil to India were deposited in euros and 45 percent in rupee in UCO Bank, an Indian financial institution, after which most of the money was transferred to Iran. This time around, UCO Bank is reluctant to serve as the conduit for funds, and India has opted to pay Iran in rupees through the Mumbai branch of an Iranian bank.

India has launched a major effort to invest in petrochemicals, chemical fertilizer, and the other upstream industries of its own oil industry. The country’s Oil and Gas Minister Dharmendra Pradhan has announced plans to invest $20 billion in Iranian oil and gas infrastructure. Iran, aiming to gain a competitive edge over other suppliers, has delivered oil at reduced prices to India, offered a longer period of credit to pay for oil purchases, and is transporting the oil almost for free. In addition, many Indian refineries are equipped to match Iranian refineries, so they cannot easily rely on other suppliers. Iran has also offered to cover the insurance for tankers that carry Iranian oil to India in lieu of an exemption from international financial institutions.

The port of Chabahar is the best, the closest, and the least costly route for Iran to reach global markets and promote the development of neighboring countries. India has committed to invest $500 million to develop Chabahar port. Iran and Afghanistan, meanwhile, want to establish an international freight corridor through this port, and several Indian wheat shipments have already gone to Afghanistan through Chabahar. New sanctions against Iran, however, threaten the success of the Chabahar project by not only preventing countries and companies from trading with Iran but also by threatening sanctions on financial institutions that engage with Iran. These sanctions will reduce the flow of capital and business to the port.

On November 7, the United States announced that it would waive sanctions on certain parts of the Chabahar port, along with the Chabahar-Afghanistan railway project and Iranian petroleum exports to Afghanistan. Since Islamabad is not allowing India to use Pakistani territory for direct business with Afghanistan, Chabahar is important for Indian access not only to Iran but to Afghanistan and beyond. The diversification of energy resources is a key pillar of Indian energy policy. If sanctions continue to punish the Iranian energy sector after the U.S. waivers expire, India will reduce oil imports from Iran and increase imports from Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Indian oil imports from Iran were expected to grow by 31 percent year-on-year, reaching 500,000 barrels per day in the fiscal year beginning April 1, 2018. Iran understands India’s problems in dealing with an unpredictable energy market and will do everything it can to ensure the security of India’s energy supply. India’s relations with Iran are also complicated by the impasse over Indian investment into developing Iran’s Farzad B gas field.

China has been one of the strongest drivers of closer relations between Iran and India. An economic corridor between China and Pakistan and the former’s investments into the port of Gwadar is a common geopolitical challenge for both India and Iran. The economic corridor is designed to limit Indian operations in the western regions of the Indian Ocean and the Oman Sea. An expanded Gwadar port, meanwhile, undermines the potential of the Chabahar port and allows Pakistan to challenge its regional rival, India, in the area of Afghanistan.

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Iran to Export 1mn bdp of Oil Despite US Sanctions

Qatar will withdraw from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Persian Gulf nation’s Energy Minister Saad Sherida al-Kaabi announced.

The decision to quit the bloc of 15 oil-producing countries that account for a significant percentage of the world’s oil production was confirmed by Qatar Petroleum, the state oil company, last Monday.

Following is an interview with Omid Shokri Kalehsar is a Istanbul based Senior Energy Security and Policy Analyst on the issue:

What are the reasons behind Qatar’s decision to withdraw from OPEC? Is it politically and economically right decision?

It seems that Qatar is interested to be more active in LNG market and keeps its place as world’s first LNG producer and exporter. But it is possible for Qatar to export more oil if Qatar withdraw from OPEC. It should be noted that there is a major challenge between Qatar and Saudi Arabia as OPEC major producers and actor. It is possible for Iran’s private sector to buy Iran crude oil from Energy Exchange and sell it to Qatar energy firms and Qatar firms after Qatar withdrawal from OPEC sell it oil to regional and world market.
Is there any relation between Qatar’s decision and the Saudi policy in the organization?

Some analysts believe that Qatar decision to withdraw from OPEC is reaction to Saudi Policy in OPEC. Qatar is against Saudi Policy in the OPEC, Saudi Arabia after Khashoggi was under pressure.  It should be noted that Qatar-Saudi relations faced major challenge after a Saudi-led coalition imposed blockade Qatar.
Any relation between Trump’s anti-OPEC policies and Doha decision?

 Stability in world oil and low price in oil market is in favor of oil consumers and US. US is against any

country or organization which decided to increase oil production or increase oil price. Trump administration can be expected to continue its policy toward OPEC and will ask OPEC member states to produce more oil to keep oil price down.

How do you see the future of the 60 years old organization?

Major OPEC oil producers must solve problems if they want OPEC to be one of the key factor in world oil market. Every country which has more production has a power in OPEC.
Cooperation and coordination between major oil producers and non-major oil producers is required. If OPEC members need to continue their role in world oil market, they require cooperation between themselves. Without cooperation and mutual understanding between all OPEC members, there is no clear future for OPEC and this organization may face serious challenges in the future.

At the present moment which Iran is under US and its regional allies’ pressure such as Saudi Arabia and UAE to cut Iran’s oil export to zero, will Doha withdrawal from OPEC affect the US goals toward Iran?

As I mentioned before in my interviews and papers it is not easy to drop Iran oil export to zero. Iran during sanction era will be able to export average 1000000 bpd and 300000 bpd condensate bpd.  Iran oil export’s drop is in favor of rest major oil exporters and all major exporters are satisfied with new sanctions imposed against Iran oil exports.

How will be possible reaction of Russia and China to Qatar’s withdraw? Will this decision affect China’s One road-One belt project? 

Russia has a plan to be a key player in LNG market. Russia is careful about all major oil and gas producers, Russia wants them to lose their share in world energy market and plans to increase its own share. China as energy costumer has its own strategy toward energy producer countries in the Middle East such as Qatar. China in promotion of its “Going out Strategy” encourages energy companies to invest in Qatar’s energy sector mainly in natural gas fields. Chinese officials have repeatedly stated that China’s common goal from One road One Belt project is to create dialogue, help to bring peace and stability in the Middle East, link East and West Asia and joint development, eliminate obstacles and biases. Arab Countries and Qatar has special position in this project. According to Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of China, Arab countries cooperation in One Road One Belt will bring Peace in the Middle East. China is interested to keep stability in the region to import oil and gas freely from the region. energy security is key factor in China foreign policy. Last September PetroChina inked its biggest Qatar LNG deal as U.S. Trade at Risk and it seems that China will increase its investment in Qatar energy sector to promote Qatari cooperation in One Road One Belt project.

Omid Shokri Kalehsar is a Senior Energy Security and Policy Analyst, Istanbul.

https://en.mehrnews.com

Interview by payman Yazdani

News Code 140293
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The Effects Of U.S. Sanctions On Iran’s Natural Gas Projects

Iran holds the second largest natural gas reserves in the world. Despite this advantage, the country controls less than one percent of the world’s natural gas market. Nevertheless, Iran is the third largest gas producer and, over the past few years, has focused on increasing its share of the global gas market. By the end of 2017, according to the National Iranian Gas Company, Iran was producing 800 million cubic meters per day. Iran’s short-term intention is to increase the volume of gas available for export by 365 million cubic meters per day by 2021.

Exporting natural gas takes a back seat in terms of priorities to more immediate economic considerations like boosting investment into oil fields, satisfying domestic consumption, and expanding gas-based industries. Iran has 50 independent gas fields, of which currently only 23 are developed and producing. Iran’s largest gas field at South Pars, with reserves of 14 trillion cubic meters, accounts for around 40 percent of the country’s gas reserves. In 2017, Iran produced 130 billion cubic meters of natural gas from this field. Iran plans to complete Phase 11 in the next two years so that it can produce about 180 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. But based on estimates from the Ministry of Oil, South Pars will experience a significant drop in pressure, known as the “dew point,” probably around 2023.

In 2015, after the signing of the nuclear agreement, Iranian officials repeated calls for an injection of around $100 billion in foreign investment into the country’s oil, gas, and petrochemical sector. Most of Iran’s oil wells have entered the second half of their lives. With 8 percent of oil production dropping automatically year on year, Iran desperately needs technology and capital from foreign countries just to stabilize its oil production. The U.S. ban on companies engaging in dollar deals with Iran, however, means that large financial institutions risk heavy fines from the Treasury Department, thus hampering any progress in Iran’s ability to gain such investments through formal and legal restrictions.

Iran signed major agreements with foreign companies in the natural gas sector, including contracts for the development of the 11th phase of the South Pars field with both French and Chinese partners designed to increase the production capacity of the field by 56 million cubic meters per day. After the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal, however, the French company Total abandoned the contract, and China National Petroleum Corporation officials stated that only they would remain in Iran’s natural gas sector. However, Chinese companies do not have a good record in Iran’s oil industry. For instance, several Chinese companies have delayed work in the Azadegan Fields for no good reason. Also, Chinese firms with interests in the United States or in U.S.-funded projects may be reluctant to invest in Iran.

According to Mohammad Hassan Adeli, former secretary general of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, sanctions are one of the main reasons for Iran’s failure in its gas export policy. However, other factors include the long process of achieving consensus on big decisions in Iran and a prevailing opinion among Iranian policy makers that gas should only be consumed domestically or turned into petrochemical products.

Iran has plans to increase its export of natural gas to other countries. For instance, Iran and Pakistan began work on a pipeline in March 2013 that would send 1.5 million cubic meters per day natural gas to Pakistan. However, US sanctions against Iran may force Pakistan to seek a less controversial alternative. Iran is also eyeing the European market. But gas exports to Europe face two major problems. Firstly, traditionally, Russia has dominated this market and Iran cannot hope to play as large a role as Russia in supplying gas to Europe. Second, in order to export Iranian gas via pipeline to Europe, Iran must secure transit through several intermediary countries.

Given recent developments in the energy market—not to mention the sanctions imposed by the Trump government—attracting foreign capital and technology to the Iranian energy industry, especially the natural gas industry, carries none of the optimism of previous years.

Foreign private companies have enough financial resources to make a splash in the Iranian market. But attracting foreign investment requires a suitable legal framework and an efficient and fast decision process, as well as political stability. In addition, Iran needs to revise its foreign policy and solve its issues with neighbors as well as the West. With neither foreign technology nor capital, Iran will not be able to produce more oil and gas to export to neighbors, let alone export to the EU.

At present, major natural gas producers such as Russia and the United States have made huge investments in their own natural gas sectors. If these major natural gas producers control the regional and world gas markets, Iran is likely to struggle to find importers. Boosting Iran’s share of the market from one percent to 10 percent, as the government would like to do, is possible only with foreign investment, which requires a reduction of political risk in the country and an effort to eliminate tension with neighboring countries.

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The Future of Iran-Pakistan Energy Relations Seems Dim

With the re-imposition of sanctions on Iran, it is not just the Islamic Republic’s global, but regional energy links which have been shaken, spelling bad tidings for future economic and political cooperation. Alternatives to Iran’s drastically under invested energy sector abound for those countries which, like Pakistan, are undertaking serious efforts to make up for their own deficits. What can the current state of relations between Pakistan and Iran tell us about the future of regional energy relations?

 

With a population of almost 200 million, Pakistan ranks as the twenty-sixth largest economy in the world. This demographic advantage brings with it greater urgency in matters regarding energy. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, 62% of Pakistan’s population is dependent on biofuels, such as wood, for cooking and heating. Given this high rate of dependency, the extent to which whole swaths of the country are lacking in electricity and gas becomes clear.

 

Recognizing the needs of the population, the Pakistani government has proposed a plan to increase domestic energy production and hydrocarbon exploration, increase natural gas imports, diversify the combined capacity of installed electricity production, improve domestic standards for energy efficiency, and gradually eliminate natural gas subsidies.

 

Iran shares land and maritime borders with several countries, such as Turkmenistan and Qatar, which are rich in gas resources. Others in close proximity, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Armenia, as well as the UAE, Kuwait, and Oman, are still in need of natural gas suppliers. In addition, Iran is home to a wide network of pipelines which (with the exception of 90 to 100 days during the winter when domestic demand peaks) has the capacity to transport gas to countries in need of additional sources of gas for much of the year.

 

Thus, in many ways, Iran is ideally positioned to benefit from both transportation and swap deals, provided there is active cooperation through diplomacy and allowing the energy industry representation in regional initiatives. The realization of this potential, however, is evidently being held back by the unfavorable international conditions to which Iran has fallen victim, not to mention its own weak attempts at energy diplomacy initiatives and active participation in energy transmission projects.

 

In 1990, Pakistan began negotiations with Iran for gas exports. At the same time, India’s growing energy demands led to joint support for what was termed the Peace Pipeline, which signaled a new chapter in India and Pakistan’s relations under which the two rivals would come together to enjoy the mutual benefits of Iranian resources. In 2011, however, due to U.S. pressure, India withdrew its support for the Peace Pipeline, an unfortunate development for Iran which had hoped the pipeline would serve to develop and expand its friendship and cooperation in the region.

 

According to the initial agreement, Iran would have transported natural gas via a 2700-kilometer pipeline through Pakistan to India. It was anticipated that in the event of a final agreement, 1100 kilometers of the pipeline would be constructed in Iran, 1000 kilometers in Pakistan, and 600 kilometers in India. The plans projected that 150 million cubic meters of gas would be exported daily to the subcontinent: 90 million cubic meters for India, and 60 million cubic meters for Pakistan.

 

Iran completed its own extension of the pipeline to deliver natural gas from South Pars to the Iran-Pakistan border by December 2014, long before the deadline. However, Islamabad has still not taken steps to comply with its own obligations, and no practical steps towards the construction of the project in Pakistan’s territory have been undertaken.

 

Diversification of energy resources represents a major pillar of Pakistan’s national energy policy. At present, Pakistan is planning to import natural gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) from new sources, as well as importing electricity from Turkmenistan. Renewable energy will also play an important role in Pakistan’s energy basket in the coming years.

 

Running Rings Around Iran: The TAPI Project

 

One of Pakistan’s alternatives in diversifying its energy resources comes in the form of the TAPI project, which was designed to deliver Turkmen natural gas to India via Afghanistan and Pakistan. The project was first conceived with U.S. support in 1990 as a means of boosting regional links while circumventing Iran.The cost of the project is estimated to range from $7 billion – $9 billion. TAPI is projected to transfer 90 million cubic meters of gas per day along the route of Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India.

The Asian Development Bank is the project’s primary sponsor, along with the World Bank, the United States, and India. In political terms, the United States and its allies, including NATO, are the most important political supporters of this pipeline.Washington’s approach to the pipeline is based on its long-term strategic goals in the region.

 

Through this economic project, the geopolitics of the region may be bolstered in the US’s favor and pave the way for the establishment of permanent bases in Afghanistan, and thus a higher presence along the borders of Iran. By removing Iran from the thriving and growing energy market of the region, the United States will cause irreparable damage to the Iranian economy and political influence in the region.

 

LNG and The Post-Pipeline Future

 

Natural gas and LNG now form 50% of Pakistan’s total energy basket, and this will increase in the coming years due to Pakistan’s new agreements with LNG suppliers. At present, Pakistan imports LNG from Qatar since a $21 billion deal was signed in February 2015 to buy liquefied natural gas from Doha. Under the agreement, Pakistan will receive 500 million cubic feet of LNG per day. The Pakistani energy crisis will likely be alleviated by imports of Qatari gas, but those imports will not resolve the problem completely.

 

Meanwhile, the shale gas revolution that the U.S. experienced in the early 2000s has provided an opportunity for the country to transition from energy importer to energy exporter – cementing its role with increasing success since 2017. 3.166 million cubic feet of these U.S. exports are planned for Pakistan. U.S. natural gas is key to diversifying the nation’s energy supplies while expanding trade relations.

 

The U.S.’s reliance on the shale gas revolution and increasing LNG exports to expand and develop relations with neighbors and allies provide Pakistan with an enthusiastic alternative supplier also looking to divert Iranian gas interests. The shale gas revolution and LNG exports provide a new tool for the U.S. to wean allied nations off of Iranian oil and gas. In 2018, Pakistan has imported 13 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of LNG from the U.S. — a huge increase compared to the previous year’s figure of 3.2 Bcf.Seeking new, more robust opportunities afforded by sea channels, Russian energy giant Gazprom is considering the possibility of supplying 5-7 million tons of LNG annually to Pakistan. In July 2014, Pakistan and Gazprom signed an agreement to construct three LNG terminals, with the first shipment arriving on July 2015. Currently, as noted above, Pakistan is increasing its LNG imports from Qatar, and hopes to do the same with Gazprom’s gas authorities; work is on-going to find ways of boosting Russian LNG exports to Pakistan.

 

In 2016, Pakistan and Azerbaijan agreed to sign deals in various fields including those that would allow Azerbaijan to supply the country with electricity, crude oil and refined petroleum products, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), and LNG. Pakistan is increasing its LNG intake amid increasing demand for gas and decline in production. In 2017, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) won a tender to supply Pakistan with two LNG cargoes to be delivered in October according to Pakistan LNG. SOCAR began delivering LNG to Pakistan in October. The LNG was delivered in two cargoes, each carrying 140,000 cubic meters.

 

Natural Gas Price, Electricity Generation

 

The cost of Iranian natural gas is of major concern to Pakistan, as the latter needs Iranian natural gas to generate electricity. At present, Pakistan’s demand outstrips its supply by between 4000-7000 megawatts. However, the cost of Iran’s gas as proposed by the IP project is too expensive for use in power plants. The electricity generated from Pakistan’s power plants, mainly located in the Baluchistan province, costs $3.5 per one million units, while the cost for Iran’s gas is $12.

 

Thanks to the China-Pakistan economic corridor, Islamabad will soon be able to generate electricity from coal-fired power plants. The goal of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project is to turn the Gwadar Port into an energy hub in the region. Islamabad is also trying to address its electricity shortage in part through other projects such as the Casa 1000 project. The Casa 1000 is one of the most important infrastructures in the regional energy market, with a capacity of 1300 megawatts from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan providing a very good platform for the purchase and sale of energy in the region. By transferring electricity from Central Asia to South Asia via Afghanistan, the economic benefits of Central Asia and South Asia will be met in a mutually advantageous regional arrangement.

 

Last September, Turkmenistan completed an upgrade of its largest electric power plant, which it is hoped will help boost exports and eventually allow supplies to Pakistan. In 2018, Calik Holding signed a memorandum of understating with Turkmenistan and Pakistan to invest $1.6 billion over the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan transmission line. Afghanistan and Pakistan will receive 1000 megawatts of electricity annually from the project, thereby leaving Iranian energy firms in the dark.

 

What is on the Horizon?

 

Iran needs to redefine the role energy exports play in its foreign policy, especially in relation to its neighbors. Iran holds the potential to use active regional energy diplomacy to maintain a share in neighboring markets, provided it succeeds in reducing tensions and thus paving the way for advanced economic benefits.

 

Pakistan is investing in renewable and planning to increase this portion of its energy basket with the construction of a hybrid solar-wind energy system to bring energy to rural areas.

U.S. sanctions against Iran are clearly another factor that will drive Pakistan toward other energy partners. Iran may well lose Pakistan as an electricity importer, especially with the progress being made in electricity deals with Turkmenistan. If Iran intends to be present in the Pakistani energy market, it first ought to offer reasonable prices which can compete with Al-Anjali as well as Turkmen gas, as worked in the case of retaining Indian business.

 

If Iran can break the deadlock with the U.S., it may finally benefit from the financial capabilities and technology needed to produce more oil and gas to export to its neighbors. If the oil and gas pipeline projects which connect Iran to its neighbors function at their highest capacities, then the links forged through the deals which result could be a key to bringing peace and stability in the region — with the added bonus of making it much harder to impose effective sanctions on Iran after such links have been cemented.

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Iran and Azerbaijan share oil fields, so what’s stopping Tehran from drilling?

Iranian-Azerbaijani energy relations go back to the 1990s collapse of the Soviet Union. Both countries hold large reserves of oil and gas, and Azerbaijan has used an active energy and foreign policy to carve itself a place on the world energy market.

 

The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline project was the first major step for Azerbaijan in this endeavor. Both countries are interested in developing successful bilateral relations based on energy. Iran hopes to use the infrastructure of Azerbaijan, particularly the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to export its oil.

 

Iran also hopes to join the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline project in the future. However, at present, Iran has not enough natural gas to export to the EU or other countries.

 

Azerbaijan has also called on Iran to use its natural gas storage for use in times of increased consumption.

 

Shared fields in the Caspian Sea represent a potential basis for future cooperation. Azerbaijan has also invested in Iranian renewables as another potential platform for partnerships.

Iran is the only state in the Caspian Sea area which has no oil and gas activities in that region. This is due partly to the fact that the majority of Iranian oil and gas fields are located in its southern half and offshore in the Gulf.

 

Shared fields in the Caspian Sea here represent

a potential basis for future cooperation

 

The ability to harness the Caspian’s reserves is not just an issue of procurement but also about distribution pipelines, thus meaning further efforts are needed in conjunction with other nations.

 

Iran’s Caspian field, Sardar-e Jangal, was discovered in 2001. According to initial estimates, this field holds 50bcm of natural gas and 2bb of oil – of which Iran could expect to obtain 500 million barrels. After the signing of the nuclear agreement, Iran offered four projects in the Caspian Sea, blocks 24, 26 and 29, as well as the Sardar-e Jangal oil field, to foreign companies for exploration and development.

 

The development plan for the deep-water Sardar-e Jangal oil field is said to cost in the range of $7-10 billion, with Iran open to foreign investment for the project. Similarly, Iran has also invited foreign companies to invest in other fields. Iran is ready to attract foreign investment, and has frequently assured foreign companies with guarantees of the security of their investments – though such guarantees are constantly weighed up by investors vis-à-vis international developments in Iran’s foreign policy.

 

After the nuclear agreement was signed, Iran invited foreign companies to invest in its oil fields, with NIOC and Norway’s ORG signing a memorandum to study feasibility, as well as in three exploration blocks in the Caspian Sea. However, this agreement has so far resulted in little by way of actual progress.In a visit to Tehran by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in April 2018, leaders of both countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the “Joint Development of Relevant Blocks of the Caspian Sea”.

 

This followed a visit to Baku by President Rouhani in March, during which both sides signed a protocol in agreeing that Iran’s state-run NIOC and Azerbaijan’s SOCAR would recover oil on a 50-50 basis. The Khazar Exploration and Production Company (KEPCO) was tasked by the NIOC to improve Iran’s share of oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea.

 

According to the document, a joint oil company would be established between the two countries, with the Alborz and Alvand fields identified as common areas in which Iran and Azerbaijan could enjoy an equal share.Iran has divided its exploration area in the Caspian into 46 blocks, eight of which have been given priority. Two blocks are shared with Azerbaijan.

 

Iran, between 2003 and 2005, carried out seismic tests across more than 4,000 square kilometres of the Caspian Sea at blocks 6, 7, 8 and 21. According to Mohsen Delvaz, CEO of KEPCO, Iran still need more exploration in order to have a clear estimate of how much capital will be required to launch extraction operations.

 

However, preliminary estimates indicate that at least $10 billion will be needed for the joint Iranian-Azeri oil field and between $7 and $10 billion for the Sardar-e Jangal field.

 

Iran is, again, open to foreign investment for the development in order to meet these heavy costs. But foreign companies remain wary, given the re-imposition of US sanctions on Iran.

One energy expert has pointed out that the Alborz and Alvand fields mark the first successful step towards stabilising Iran’s energy rights in the Caspian Sea, but the recent agreement has also been a cause for uncertainty.The challenges for Iran in extracting hydrocarbon resources from the Caspian Sea mainly draw from concerns about the depth of its waters and the land-locked nature of the sea. This results in a lack of connection with open water, operational restrictions related to transportation of equipment, the changing climate, the very difficult and complex nature of providing support due to distance from the coast, as well as the cost and risk of exploration operations, a lack of background in fleet maintenance and offshore services, and technological sanctions.

 

Iran has a lot of experience in the development and production of hydrocarbon fields

in the offshore sector

 

Of course, Iran has a lot of experience in the development and production of hydrocarbon fields in the offshore sector in general, but these experiences are of a completely different nature in the southern parts of the country and in the Gulf.

The Caspian Sea, due to its depth, requires special conditions at all stages of drilling, development, production and transfer.

 

The sanctions regime represents the over-riding issue in these challenges. It is possible for Iran to sign agreements with Chinese and Russian energy firms to invest in joint fields in the Caspian Sea, yet deals with China have so far failed to materialise.

 

Azerbaijan is far more active than Iran in the Caspian Sea. This is to expected, since the US withdrawal from the JCPOA allowed Azerbaijan to attract foreign technology and capital for extraction from a joint field with Iran, playing an important role in the regional energy market at Iran’s expense.

 

Furthermore, Azerbaijan can bolster EU energy security via the TANAP and TAP projects – of which Iran is not yet a part.Geological and financial problems will continue to plague Iranian efforts, yet an active regional foreign and energy diplomacy could yet lead to breakthroughs.

 

Chinese companies would not be the best option for Iran in terms of the Caspian, due to financial requirements and insufficient experience in deep water.The crucial issue is to resolve the tension with the west – and this requires engagement with the US. Without foreign financial capabilities and technology, Iran will face serious problems in playing a key role in the regional energy market and producing more oil and gas from joint fields, let alone those over which it has full sovereignty.

 

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The Future Of Iran-Pakistan Energy Relations

Energy relations form one of the main pillars of Iranian-Pakistani relations. In 1990, increased domestic demand for natural gas led Pakistan to begin negotiations to export gas from Iran. India’s growing energy demand led to joint support for a 2,700-kilometer “Peace Pipeline” that would allow India and Pakistan to import Iranian resources. According to the initial agreement, 1,100 kilometers would be constructed in Iran, 1,000 kilometers in Pakistan, and 600 kilometers in India. A projected 150 million cubic meters of gas would be exported daily to India and Pakistan, with 90 million cubic meters for India and 60 million cubic meters for Pakistan.

In 2011, however, due to U.S. pressure, India withdrew its support for the Peace Pipeline. This was bad news for Iran, which hoped that the pipeline would help develop and expand its friendship and cooperation in the region. Nevertheless, Iran completed the required pipeline to deliver natural gas from South Pars to the Iran-Pakistan border by December 2014. But Islamabad has not taken any practical steps to keep to its end of the deal.

Pakistan’s former Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman has stated that in order to achieve long-term goals of regional stability, Pakistan’s national interest require new energy transit projects. Pakistan supports the economic strengthening of the region and has stated that the energy and energy sectors are important factors in realizing regional political and economic goals. But it has increasingly looked to places other than Iran to develop these resources.

One of Pakistan’s alternatives to diversifying energy resource is the TAPI project, a U.S.-backed rival to the Peace Pipeline proposed back in 1990 to deliver Turkmen natural gas to India via Afghanistan and Pakistan. India joined the project in 2008. The leaders of the four countries signed an implementation contract in December 2015, and practical work finally began in 2016. The first gas will start to flow in early 2020. The project will cost an estimated $7-9 billion and will transfer 90 million cubic meters of gas per day to these countries.

Liquified natural gas (LNG) now forms 50 percent of Pakistan’s energy basket, and this will increase in coming years due to Pakistan’s new agreements with LNG suppliers. In February 2015, Pakistan signed a $21 billion deal to buy 500 million cubic feet of gas a day from Qatar. The arrival of Qatari gas will alleviate but not solve Pakistan’s energy crisis. So, Pakistan is looking elsewhere. Because of the shale gas revolution, the United States became an energy exporter by 2017 and plans to send about 3 million cubic feet to Pakistan. The Russian energy giant Gazprom is also considering the possibility of supplying 5-7 million tons of LNG annually to Pakistan. In July 2014, Pakistan and Gazprom signed an agreement to construct three LNG terminals, and the first shipment arrived in July 2015. Pakistan and Azerbaijan also signed deals in 2016 for the latter to supply electricity, crude and refined oil products, and both LNG and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). The Azerbaijani state oil company SOCAR will begin delivering LNG to Pakistan in the coming months.

At present, Pakistan lacks 4,000-7,000 megawatts of the energy it needs. Iran is a natural place to turn. But the cost of Iran’s gas is too expensive for use in Pakistan’s power plants. The electricity generated from Pakistan’s power plants, mainly located in Baluchistan province, costs $3.5 per one million units, while the figure for Iran’s gas is $12. Increasingly Pakistan is looking east. Thanks to the China-Pakistan economic corridor, Islamabad will soon be able to generate electricity from coal-fired power plants and import electricity from places like Turkmenistan. The larger goal of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project is to turn the Gwadar Port into an energy hub in the region. Islamabad is also trying to address part of its electricity shortage through other projects such as the Casa 1000 project, which is designed to boost the electricity trade between the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic and the South Asian countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Iran needs to rely on energy diplomacy to maintain regional markets and especially to reduce tensions with neighbors, thereby paving the way for advanced economic benefits. Pakistan is investing in renewables and planning to increase the share of renewables in its national energy basket with the construction of a hybrid solar-wind energy system to bring energy to rural areas. If Pakistan can attract foreign capital and technology to build required energy infrastructure (such as LNG terminal and pipelines), it will require less Iranian natural gas and electricity, instead relying on others to make up the shortfall. U.S. sanctions against Iran will be another factor influencing Pakistan’s preference for energy partners.

www.lobelog.com

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Washington boosts LNG with Iran in sanctions crosshairs

The shale gas revolution has had a staggering effect on the world energy market, shifting many prior assumptions regarding the geopolitics of energy.
Whereas in 2000 and the first years of the new millennium, shale oil and gas accounted for just one percent of all fossil fuels produced in the United States, the country has now moved towards energy self-sufficiency and is taking on the role of an exporter.

Whereas the Obama administration was a major force in fostering this development as a means of freeing the country from foreign dependency through diversification, in tandem with increased green energy supplies, the Trump administration seems to have sought to focus on energy in a more traditional approach.

The shale gas revolution and consequent US energy boom finally meant that a static fact of world energy geopolitics, – ie: that the US was dependent on oil mainly imported from the Middle East – could be cast aside. The US is now energy self-sufficient and free to export Liquefied Natural Gas to neighbours and allies around the world, and thus has added to Washington’s political flexibility.

The uptick in gas production in the US has already decreased LNG prices in the EU and Asia and thus presents a challenge to the old energy order

Not surprisingly, this turn of events is being monitored closely by other energy exporters.

The US is already using its energy exports to reduce the EU’s dependency on Russian gas, while exerting pressure on its allies to see it as an alternative to Iranian natural gas.

The uptick in gas production in the US has already decreased LNG prices in the EU and Asia and thus presents a challenge to the old energy order. In terms of US national security then, the energy boom can be examined from two perspectives, first, its implications for US energy security and second, its implications for the wider field of international relations and its geopolitics.

 

US withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal 

Iran’s economy and energy sector has been devastated by the US and EU sanctions brought against it due to Iran’s former attempt to build a nuclear programme. Sanctions have not only scuppered Iran’s chances of success in achieving its energy goals but also have forced Iran to become more proactive in consolidating regional relations.

Since Washington’s departure from the JCPOA agreement, energy companies who had only just began to consider re-entering Iran have withdrawn in anticipation of further sanctions. Few international banks or financial institutes are willing to participate in energy projects in Iran under such conditions.
The US is interested in reducing Iran’s role in regional and global energy markets, with Washington often declaring a wish to bring Iranian oil production down to zero. It is a fact that American sanctions against Iran’s energy sector have vastly reduced the country’s production capacity. US sanctions have also wrought severe harm in terms of technology and finance.

The US plans to increase LNG exports to countries which depend on Iranian hydrocarbons in an attempt to wean these countries off their reliance. But some analysts believe the US oil and gas sector is unlikely to gain Iran’s share of the market, as technically, Iran’s export oil grades are heavier and sourer than the light, sweet crude exported from the US.

 

Following the US withdrawal from the treaty, the country further cut imports of oil from Iran. Japan now imports 5.5 percent of its oil from Iran, according to the Japanese Ministry of Economy and Trade. In August, Japan was receiving 17,775 barrels per day and bought 3.39 million barrels of crude in one month.

Japan called for an exemption from the US embargo on Iran, which was granted by the Trump administration – but only for six months. Part of Iran’s share of oil is expected to fall victim to an influx of LNG exports and US gas condensate onto Japan’s market. Sanctions against Iran’s energy industry have not only reduced Iran’s oil and gas production capacity, but also reduced Iran’s share of the global energy market. The rising lack of investment in the Iranian oil and gas industry is one particularly immediate result of renewed sanctions.

Reducing oil production capacity and, consequently, reducing Iran’s oil export potential will force Iran to find loans and facilities from banks and global financial institutions in order to develop its facilities – yet it is clear that new US sanctions will challenge Iran’s ability to retain much of its oil production capacity regardless.

Given the increase in natural gas producers and LNGs on the market, the US energy boom provides a good opportunity for Iran’s rivals – not least the US itself – from moving in on Iran’s share of the regional and global energy market.

The increase in US oil and shale gas production has made Iran more pressured to find new markets, yet the country does not have the capacity to produce LNG, thus competing with the US, and it is unclear when the capital and technology needed to complete its LNG project units will be provided.

The US superiority in terms of advanced technology, research, investment, and diplomatic reach ensure it will retain a high position in the world energy market, while Iran will likely flounder further. If Iran and the US agree on current political and security problems, Iran may gain the foreign capital and technology needed to recover some of its oil and gas production capacity.

Energy continues to play an important role in US foreign policy, with implications not only on relations with designated rivals but also allies across the world.

Energy exports play a key role in US relations with its neighbours and allies, and are a key tool in fostering and furthering relations with others. Energy exports as a means of expanding relations and helping US allies in South Asia and Europe are sure to lead to interesting geopolitical developments, and US LNG exports are most likely to be effective in reducing Iranian oil exports to Japan and South Korea.

Turkey and India


Turkey is a major purchaser of Iranian natural gas. Turkey has huge investments in LNG storage facilities and plans to increase its share of LNG in the domestic energy market. In 2015, Turkey began to import LNG from the US, and is now the second-largest importer of US LNG in Europe.

An increase in US and Qatari LNG – alongside new natural gas transit projects such as TANAP and the Turkish Stream – means that Iran may be largely sidelined by Turkey in the near future. Similarly, India has also signed a 20-year agreement to be supplied with US LNG, also ensuring a reduction of Iranian supplies to the Indian energy market over a similar period.

South Korea 

Seoul is one of the main customers of Iranian gas condensate. More than 55 percent of Iran’s gas condensate is exported to South Korea. According to official statistics from the Ministry of Oil, Iranian gas condensate exports in 2017 numbered 428,000 barrels per day on average.

Since the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, major Korean companies importing Iranian oil and gas condensate have cut imports from Iran. In the first six months of 2018, the Hanwa Total Petrochemical Company, the largest importer of Iranian gas condensate, imported 15.92 million barrels from Iran, but since August has reduced its imports to one-third, in favour of supplies from Qatar and the United States.


Japan

Japan is another main consumer of Iranian oil in East Asia. According to the Japanese Petroleum Association, in 2017 the country imported 172,216 bpd of oil from Iran, down 24.2 percent from the previous year. Iran’s oil accounted for 5.3 percent of total oil imports to Japan’s refineries in 2017.

Japan called for an exemption from the US embargo on Iran, which was granted by the Trump administration – but only for six months

Following the US withdrawal from the treaty, the country further cut imports of oil from Iran. Japan now imports 5.5 percent of its oil from Iran, according to the Japanese Ministry of Economy and Trade. In August, Japan was receiving 17,775 barrels per day and bought 3.39 million barrels of crude in one month.

Japan called for an exemption from the US embargo on Iran, which was granted by the Trump administration – but only for six months. Part of Iran’s share of oil is expected to fall victim to an influx of LNG exports and US gas condensate onto Japan’s market.

Sanctions against Iran’s energy industry have not only reduced Iran’s oil and gas production capacity, but also reduced Iran’s share of the global energy market. The rising lack of investment in the Iranian oil and gas industry is one particularly immediate result of renewed sanctions.

Reducing oil production capacity and, consequently, reducing Iran’s oil export potential will force Iran to find loans and facilities from banks and global financial institutions in order to develop its facilities – yet it is clear that new US sanctions will challenge Iran’s ability to retain much of its oil production capacity regardless.

Given the increase in natural gas producers and LNGs on the market, the US energy boom provides a good opportunity for Iran’s rivals – not least the US itself – from moving in on Iran’s share of the regional and global energy market.

The increase in US oil and shale gas production has made Iran more pressured to find new markets, yet the country does not have the capacity to produce LNG, thus competing with the US, and it is unclear when the capital and technology needed to complete its LNG project units will be provided.

The US superiority in terms of advanced technology, research, investment, and diplomatic reach ensure it will retain a high position in the world energy market, while Iran will likely flounder further. If Iran and the US agree on current political and security problems, Iran may gain the foreign capital and technology needed to recover some of its oil and gas production capacity.
Energy continues to play an important role in US foreign policy, with implications not only on relations with designated rivals but also allies across the world.

www.alaraby.co.uk/

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Tanker Insurance Cancellations threaten Iranian energy sector

The US’ withdrawal from the JCPOA and declaration of a new set of sanctions has been hard to swallow for those planning Iran’s energy sector, as they had been relying on the deal as a means of revivifying Iran’s oil and gas production capacity. These new sanctions are set to be implemented against Iran’s oil and gas sector on November 4. This is likely to have ahuge impact on Iran’s coffers, with insurers reportedly already halting coverage for shipments.

Following the announcement of a resumption of sanctions against Iran, owners of oil tankers were some of the first to start refusing trade with the country. When the previous round of sanctions against Iran was first established, tanker insurance was considered one of the main barriers to Iranian oil exports, as, given that most ship-owners carrying Iranian oil were not able to secure insurance, a number of Asian trading partners were forced to concede to government-sponsored security coverings.

When sanctions were imposed in 2012, the European Union prevented the International Group Corporation in London from providing any cover for Iran-bound cargo, which led to the de facto deployment of Iran’s tanker fleet, as foreign ships seeking to carry Iranian oil would henceforth be excluded from operating in the mainstream oil tanker market. This time, however, it remains unclear as to whether the EU will back US-led sanctions with such gusto.

Iranian companies have announced that they will continue to insure oil tankers, although this is somewhat difficult to do without connecting the Iranian banking system to international banks.

An Iranian supertanker called Happiness, which docked at a terminal operated by Iran’s national oil company on Kharg Island, for instance, currently has on board 2m barrels of oil. It was set to head for Asian markets at the beginning of September, although with Iran’s return to pariah status, its fate is now unclear. Iran’s own insurance companies are not recognized in international insurance circles. Additionally, these companies are facing their own domestic problems due to a lack of credit among financial and credit institutions in the country.

As one of Iran’s biggest export markets, firms and refineries in India in particularare very concerned about the insurance for tankers going between the two countries. Some refineries have already cut back on purchases of oil from Iran. Reuters reports that two major Indian refineries, Indian Petroleum and Bharat Petroleum, will reduce their purchases from Iran due to insurance concerns specifically. In response, Iran is planning to insure tankers transiting oil to India and to give special discount to Indian buyers.

Iran will not want to lose its share of the Indian energy market. According to Business India Online, The Indian government has allowed two Iranian insurance companies to pay a one-billion-dollar insurance coverage for Iranian oil tankers. This effort from New Delhi may have China, as the other largest consumer of Iranian oil, in mind. Custom from these major importers, however, are unlikely to mitigate the effects of US sanctions sufficiently by November if Iran is cut off from the global oil market.

EU buyers are also concerned about Tanker insurance. Coverage for the vast majority of ship leasing contracts is provided by IG Insurance Services Inc., if damage occurs, all actors in the tanker supply chain are aware that the group presides over billions of dollars in order to compensate. Even if both public and private insurance companies accept the risk of providing insurance for Iranian oil tankers, since no Iranian insurance company is a member of the International Syndicate of Oil Insurance, Iran’s insurance policy is essentially uncertifiable.

If Iran green lights such shipments regardless, it would be possible for Iranian tankers to be detained in international waters, leading to very severe legal consequences for Iran. The fact that both China and India have asked Iran to bear the cost of transporting and insuring their oil products shows that these Iranian oil customers want to put all liabilities on Iran as the seller.

To sum up, the hope of being able to by-pass tanker insurance with Iranian insurance is an overly optimistic move and may lead to an even greater conundrum of problems for Iran.

 

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Iran’s joint oil fields could resolve regional tensions

It is common for oil and gas fields to be joint-owned by two or more countries, which often presents various challenges. There is a particular fervour over the need to focus on extracting from such fields, with international energy companies often invited to vie for generous extraction contracts.Iran shares 26 oil and gas fields with its neighbours yet, due to a lack of technological and financial investment over the past years, Iran has been unable to extract a competitive amount of oil from such fields. This has led to their exploitation by Iran’s neighbours. Studies show that around 20 per cent of Iran’s recognised oil reserves and 30 per cent of its natural gas reserves are in joint fields.

 

So far, Iran has only been able to procure from ten of these 26 fields. Despite an increase in productivity in these fields – most notably in the South Pars, in the Persian Gulf – the Rouhani Administration has failed to acquire the capital and foreign technology needed to compete with, let alone acquire an edge over, neighbours in terms of procurements.

 

The majority of Iran’s joint oil fields are located on the Iraqi border – Iran shares at least five oil fields with Iraq. Iraq, for its part, has a seven-year plan to increase oil production capacity and reach 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd). Its focus has been on those fields it shares with Iran and, in 2010, the Iraqi government invited Iran to invest in joint fields with the aim of increasing production and developing an equal production capacity.

 

However, Iran was unable to invest more in these joint fields due to a lack of financial resources. During the period in which heavy sanctions were placed on the Iranian energy sector, Iraq produced 295,000 bpd from joint fields with Iran, yet Iran was able to produce a mere 130,000 bpd in the same period. Iraq also managed to sign agreements with major international oil companies to increase its share from joint fields with Iran. Iraq revised oil contracts and added new conditions in order to attract oil companies, offering increased benefits in return for technological know-how and investment. Iraq’s new contracts are more attractive for oil companies, while the fields themselves are geologically favourable for procurement. Iraq has a program to increase oil production from joint areas shared with Iran.

Iran has no production capacity in its fields in the Caspian Sea, where it has two oil fields shared with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Both countries plan to increase production from these fields and Iran will be not able to attract the foreign technology and capital needed to benefit due to US sanctions.

Qatar has also become a major exporter of liquefied natural gas, with a lot of investment in foreign technology and gas production focused on the South Pars. Given that the South Pars field has been Iran’s top priority, over the past five years Iran has at least succeeded in increasing procurement through investment here. In March 2017, Iran drew a competitive 250,000 bpd from the South Pars, with Qatar drawing 300,000 bpd over the same period.

Iran and Saudi Arabia share four oil and gas fields. By 2017, Iran’s oil production from the Forouzan oil field – also in the Persian Gulf – numbered between 38,000 to 40,000 bpd, while the Saudi side has far outstripped its rival with a production capacity of 400,000 bpd from this field. Similar imbalances are apparent in all shared fields in this area.

 

Joint oil and gas fields are important for all countries in the region, with all countries which share oil and gas fields with Iran gaining billions from their procurement. The US withdrawal from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, more commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal) has motivated many regional rivals to accelerate their activities further. Since major foreign oil firms have abandoned Iran in response to the now-ineffective agreement, these firms have similarly sought activities elsewhere in the region. Unconfirmed reports so far state that around $6 billion worth of gas has thus been lost to competitors. Any delay in the development of joint fields will thus cause irreparable losses for the country. Experts warn that any delay in signing contracts for foreign investment will hinder the development of joint fields and will help the neighbouring states to plunder Iranian oil reserves.

 

Cooperation between Iran and neighbouring Arab countries in the development of plans for joint fields could provide the basis for increasing security and stability in the region. Moreover, foreign investments are important for Iran in recovering its oil and gas production capacities. Iran’s huge oil and gas reserves can play a key role in the world energy market yet, as expected, with the withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear agreement the Iranian energy industry faces yet more challenges in attracting foreign investment and technology. After the removal of sanctions, Iran plans to create conditions for attracting foreign investors by drafting new oil contracts. Iran has repeatedly stated that it needs $2 billion of foreign investment to revive its oil and gas production capacity.

 

Considering developments in the energy market and US sanctions, attracting foreign investment and technology to the Iranian energy industry will be tougher than ever. Achieving the goals of the country’s Sixth Development Plan and Twenty-Year Development Plan is possible only with foreign investment, which requires a reduction of political risk in the country. In the event of a reversal of fortunes in terms of foreign policy and the provision of other requirements for foreign companies, capital can be expected to pour in – particularly from Russian and Chinese companies.

 

A change of attitude in foreign policy and an attempt to eliminate tensions with neighbouring countries will be an important step towards attracting foreign investors. An increase in the oil and gas production capacities of the country is a short and mid-term priority for Iran’s Oil Ministry. Yet Iran must resolve political tension with its neighbours and also negotiate with the West to if these goals are to become workable.

Iran’s joint oil fields could resolve regional tensions

 

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